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The desire for impact

  • Dur, Robert
  • Glazer, Amihai

This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make a firm in a competitive labor market face an upward-sloping supply curve of labor, lead workers with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different wages, may alleviate the hold-up problem in firm-specific investment, can make it profitable for an employer to give workers autonomy in effort or task choice, and can propagate shocks to unemployment.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Psychology.

Volume (Year): 29 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 285-300

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Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:29:y:2008:i:3:p:285-300
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep

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