IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v10y2006i1p63-71.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in (k + 1)-st price common value auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Ilia Tsetlin

    ()

  • Aleksandar Pekeč

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Ilia Tsetlin & Aleksandar Pekeč, 2006. "On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in (k + 1)-st price common value auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(1), pages 63-71, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:1:p:63-71
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-006-0005-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-006-0005-0
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 439-454.
    2. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    3. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1997. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1247-1282, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Symmetric equilibrium; Common value; Auction theory; D44; C62; C72; D41;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:1:p:63-71. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.