Voting, Wealth Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Labor Supply
We examine the link between voting outcomes, wealth heterogeneity, and endogenous labor - leisure choice in the majority-voting - endogenous-growth frameworks of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Das and Ghate (2004). We augment these frameworks to incorporate leisure-dependent utility and allow households to vote on factor-specific income taxes. When agents vote on factor-specific taxes, we show that the asymptotic convergence of factor holdings does not imply unanimity over the growth-maximizing tax policy in the steady state. Unanimity over growth-maximizing policies holds only when agents vote on a general income tax,and when agents vote on factor-specific taxes but labor is exogenous.
Volume (Year): 63 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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