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Entrepreneurship and organization design

Listed author(s):
  • Roessler, Christian
  • Koellinger, Philipp

We model entrepreneurship and the emergence of firms as an outcome of simultaneous bidding for labor services among heterogeneous agents. What distinguishes our approach from prior work is that occupational choice and job matching are determined simultaneously, so that the opportunity costs of entrepreneurs are accounted for. Those who are relatively unmanageable, while possibly excellent managers themselves, become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs compete and create value by building efficient organizations and offering potentially well-paid jobs to others. While the entry of an additional entrepreneur typically reduces some individual wages, we show that it always raises the average wage and depresses the average income of incumbent entrepreneurs. This result may help explain the empirically low returns to entrepreneurship.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292112000323
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 56 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 888-902

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:4:p:888-902
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.02.014
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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