- Kirkegaard, René & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 2008.
"Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 145-165, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: See citations under working paper version above.
- Orzach, Ram & Overgaard, Per Baltzer & Tauman, Yair, 2002.
"Modest Advertising Signals Strength,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 340-358, Summer.
Other versions: See citations under working paper version above.
- Mark N. Hertzendorf & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2001.
"Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(4), pages 621-662, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by:
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006.
"Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure,"
Working Papers
0625, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdu, 2005.
"When Cheaper Is Better: Fee Determination In The Market For Equity Mutual Funds,"
Business Economics Working Papers
wb054309, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
[Downloadable!]
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2003.
"Secrecy and Safety,"
Working Papers
0317, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005.
"Secrecy and Safety,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1074-1091, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Andrew Daughety & Jennifer Reinganum, .
"Secrecy and Safety,"
American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings
1039, American Law & Economics Association.
[Downloadable!]
- Jennifer F. Reinganum & Andrew F. Daughety, 2004.
"Secrecy and Safety,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
53, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007.
"Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling,"
Working Papers
0703, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
- Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008.
"Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information,"
Economic Theory,
Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:- Paolo G. GARELLA & Emmanuel PETRAKIS, 2007.
"Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information,"
Departemental Working Papers
2007-12, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy.
[Downloadable!]
- Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005.
"Minimum Quality Standards and Consumers Information,"
Working Papers
0510, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- P. Garella & P. Petrakis, 2004.
"Minimum Quality Standards and ConsumersÕ Information,"
Working Papers
532, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna.
[Downloadable!]
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006.
"Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information,"
Working Papers
0613, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
- Heijnen, P., 2007.
"Informative advertising by an environmental group,"
CeNDEF Working Papers
07-02, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
[Downloadable!]
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2007.
"Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6150, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: - Wolfgang Gick, 2004.
"Little Firms and Big Patents: The Incentives To Disclose Competencies,"
Industrial Organization
0411010, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
- Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2006.
"Credible Ratings,"
Working Papers
tecipa-219, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:- Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2008.
"Credible ratings,"
Theoretical Economics,
Society for Economic Theory, vol. 3(3), pages 325-365, September.
[Downloadable!]
- Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2006.
"Credible Ratings,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
damiano-06-01-17-01-56-45, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Jan 2006.
[Downloadable!]
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005.
"Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling,"
Working Papers
0520, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004.
"Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information,"
Working Papers
0417, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Hellström, Jörgen & Rudholm, Niklas, 2003.
"Advertising as a Signaling Device in the Swedish Pharmaceuticals Market,"
Umeå Economic Studies
612, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Laurent Linnemer, 2008.
"Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality even without Repeat Purchases,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!]
- Albaek, Svend & Mollgaard, Peter & Overgaard, Per B, 1997.
"Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 429-43, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: See citations under working paper version above.
- Hansen, Per Svejstrup & Mollgaard, Hans Peter & Overgaard, Per Baltzer & Sorensen, Jan Rose, 1996.
"Asymmetric adjustment in symmetric duopoly,"
Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 183-188, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by:
- John Bennett & Manfredi M. A. La Manna, 2001.
"Reversing the Keynesian Asymmetry,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1556-1563, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 1994.
"Equilibrium effects of potential entry when prices signal quality,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 367-383, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: See citations under working paper version above.
- Albaek, Svend & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 1994.
"Advertising and pricing to deter or accommodate entry when demand is unknown: Comment,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 83-87, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by:
- Kyle Bagwell, 2006.
"Signaling and entry deterrence: A multi-dimensional analysis,"
Discussion Papers
0506-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 1993.
"Price as a signal of quality : A discussion of equilibrium concepts in signalling games,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 483-504, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: See citations under working paper version above.
- Albaek, Svend & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 1992.
"Upstream Pricing and Advertising Signal Downstream Demand,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(4), pages 677-98, Winter.
Other versions:
- Albaek, S. & Overgaard, P.B., 1991.
"Upstream Pricing and Advertising Signal Downstream Demand,"
Economics Working Papers
1992-2, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
- Albaek, S. & Overgaard, P.B., 1992.
"Upstream Pricing and Advertising Signal Downstream Demand,"
Papers
9209, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
See citations under working paper version above.
This page was last updated on 2008-10-3.