The Signaling Role of Subsidies
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2013-0134
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Ismail Saglam, 2022.
"Self-regulation under asymmetric cost information,"
Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 49(2), pages 335-368, June.
- Saglam, Ismail, 2018. "Self-Regulation Under Asymmetric Cost Information," MPRA Paper 87151, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Akira Miyaoka, 2019. "The Signaling Effect of Emission Taxes Under International Duopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(3), pages 691-720, March.
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