Little Firms and Big Patents: The Incentives To Disclose Competencies
AbstractThis paper offers a theoretical treatment of information disclosure through patenting. We consider a signaling model in which two domestic firms disclose their competencies to a foreign firm. Conditions are discussed under which separating and pooling equilibria occur, together with a domination-based re-finement. Depending on the payoff situation of the foreign firm, separating and semi-separating equilibria occur in which the firm with the higher competencies discloses. We show that subsidizing the costs of patent applications has no impact on the outcome.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0411010.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 18 Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 21
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Patenting; Disclosure; R&D Cooperations; Asymmetric Information.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
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