Must Trust Bust?
AbstractOur trust in competition policy is based on faith in markets. When markets are oligopolies, already classical economists’ trust in competition busted: Oligopolies carry the seeds of collusion. To develop, collusion needs trust between firms. But new leniency programmes are designed to bust that trust. I discuss when trust busters are likely to succeed and when trust prevails.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 02-2002.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 04 Feb 2002
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 34 99
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
More information through EDIRC
Competition policy; Oligopolies; Collusion; Trust; Leniency programmes;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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