Little Firms and Big Patents: A Model of Small-Firm Patent Signaling
Abstract"Patent strategies of small technology-intensive firms are difficult to explain with standard incentive arguments based on intellectual property rights. This paper develops a rationale for patent filing as a disclosure strategy. We develop a two-sender signaling game to study patenting incentives of two technology start-ups to file in a large-scale patent system with the goal to attract a user firm. Both start-ups may decide to invest in costly modification of their patent application before filing. The paper identifies a separating equilibrium in which the high-quality inventor files and so separates from its technology competitor. Of particular interest is the study of pooling and semi-separating equilibria, as well as the impact of subsidies. We find that a higher quality of a country's inventions, reflected in the possible innovative steps and thus in higher expected profits for foreign user firms, may increase the chance of the relatively lower-quality inventor to enter international technology markets." Copyright (c) 2008, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Volume (Year): 17 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Braun, Thorsten V. & Lehmann, Erik E. & Schwerdtfeger, Manuel T., 2011. "The stock market evaluation of IPO-firm takeovers," UO Working Papers 01-11, University of Augsburg, Chair of Management and Organization.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.