Equilibrium effects of potential entry when prices signal quality
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 38 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
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- Byoung Heon Jun & In-Uck Park, 2005.
172782000000000041, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Marcel Boyer & Philippe Mahenc & Michel Moreaux, 2002.
"Entry Preventing Locations Under Incomplete Information,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Boyer, Marcel & Mahenc, Philippe & Moreaux, Michel, 2003. "Entry preventing locations under incomplete information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 809-829, June.
- P. Vanin, 2009. "Competition, Reputation and Compliance," Working Papers 682, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- P. Vanin, 2009. "Competition, Reputation and Cheating," Working Papers 683, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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