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Market Transparency And Competition Policy

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Author Info

  • Møllgaard, H. Peter

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Overgaard, Per Baltzer

    (University of Aarhus)

Abstract

We survey some of the literature on the effects of improved market transparency on competition in ologopoly. Generally, improved transparency from the perspective of irms makes detection of deviations from tacitly collusive agreements easier, thus facilitating oligopolistic coordination. On the other hand, improved transparency from the perspective of consumers, particularly in terms of easier comparability of goods characteristics, has ambiguous effects: More elastic demands make deviations from collusive prices more profitable to firms in the short run, but they also make future retaliation by rivals more severe. Which of these forces will dominate in a dynamic oligopoly competition is shown to depend on the market-specifics. In light of the theoretical results, we discuss the likely effects on inter-firm competition of information exchange and online trading institutions as well as the American and European competition policy attitude towards market transparency.

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File URL: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/cbsweb/handle/10398/7567
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 06-2001.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 30 Jul 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2001_006

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Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 34 99
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Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
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Related research

Keywords: Market transparency; Repeated oligopoly; Secret price-cutting; Customer switching;

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Cited by:
  1. Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr, 2013. "Transparency in Electricity Markets," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
  2. Per Baltzer Overgaard & Peter Møllgaard, 2005. "Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  3. Christian Growitsch & Thomas Wein, 2005. "Negotiated Third Party Access—An Industrial Organisation Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 165-183, September.
  4. Møllgaard, Peter, 2002. "Must Trust Bust?," Working Papers 02-2002, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  5. KNAUFF, Malgorzata, 2006. "Market transparency and Bertrand competition," CORE Discussion Papers 2006037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Rasch, Alexander & Herre, Jesko, 2013. "Customer-side transparency, elastic demand, and tacit collusion under differentiation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 51-59.

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