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Price competition and market transparency: evidence from a random response technique

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  • Klaus Friesenbichler
  • George Clarke
  • Michael Wong

Abstract

Surveys can increase market transparency when information asymmetries are present—but this will only happen when respondents answer questions truthfully. Sometimes, however, it might not be in the respondents’ best interest to provide truthful information on their firm or market. This will be especially true when other firms can exploit any information they provide. Understanding when, and under what conditions, respondents answer questions truthfully is important to researchers studying these markets and to policymakers using firm surveys to identify ways of improving the business environment. Using data from two countries in South Asia, this paper uses a random response technique to identify respondents that do not answer truthfully. We label these respondents as ‘reticent’. We show that respondents become more reticent when their firms face intense price competition. We argue that this is because intense competition gives respondents a greater incentive to misreport information to reduce market transparency. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Friesenbichler & George Clarke & Michael Wong, 2014. "Price competition and market transparency: evidence from a random response technique," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 5-21, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:41:y:2014:i:1:p:5-21
    DOI: 10.1007/s10663-013-9231-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Friesenbichler, Klaus S. & Selenko, Eva & Clarke, George R.G., 2015. "How much of a nuisance is greasing the palms? A study on job dedication and attitudes towards corruption reports under answer bias control," MPRA Paper 67331, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Lambsdorff Johann Graf & Schulze Günther G., 2015. "Guest Editorial: Special Issue on Corruption at the Grassroots-level: What Can We Know About Corruption?," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 235(2), pages 100-114, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Survey reticence; Answer bias; Candour; Market transparency; Random response technique; Asymmetric information; Competition; Price taker; C80; C81; C83; C93; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General
    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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