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Private equity investments and disclosure policy

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  • BEUSELINCK, Christophe
  • DELOOF, Marc
  • MANIGART, Sophie

Abstract

We investigate whether a firm’s disclosure policy is affected by the changing corporate setting and intensified corporate governance associated with private equity (PE) investments. For a unique sample of unquoted PE backed firms we observe a significant switch to increased financial disclosure in the pre-investment year, consistent with the hypothesis that entrepreneurs attempt to reduce information asymmetries inherent to the PE application by increasing their disclosure levels. Further, we document that the governance and professionalization impact of PE investors affects their portfolio firms’ financial disclosure positively. Finally, differentiating on investor type (government versus non-government related) reveals no overall effect on disclosure, both in the pre- as in the post-investment years. Results are robust to various sensitivity checks.

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File URL: https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container1244/files/TEW%20-%20Onderzoek/Working%20Papers/RPS/2004/RPS-2004-025.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2004025.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2004025

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Postal: Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerpen
Web page: https://www.uantwerp.be/en/faculties/applied-economic-sciences/
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Keywords: Disclosure; Private equity; Unlisted firms; Monitoring; Corporate governance;

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Cited by:
  1. McKenzie, Michael & Satchell, Stephen & Wongwachara, Warapong, 2012. "Nonlinearity and smoothing in venture capital performance data," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 782-795.
  2. Tom Caneghem & Geert Campenhout, 2012. "Quantity and quality of information and SME financial structure," Small Business Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 341-358, September.

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