Articles
- McAdams, David, 2008.
"Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions,"
Journal of Econometrics,
Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-85, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by:
- Le-Yu Chen & Jerzy Szroeter, 2009.
"Hypothesis testing of multiple inequalities: the method of constraint chaining,"
CeMMAP working papers
CWP13/09, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
[Downloadable!]
- McAdams, David, 2007.
"Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool,"
Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 48-53, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by:
- Damianov, Damian S. & Oechssler, Jörg & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2007.
"Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply - Experimental Evidence,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
07-68, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2008.
"A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
08tara, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008.
[Downloadable!]
- David McAdams & Michael Schwarz, 2007.
"Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 260-276, March.
[Downloadable!]
Cited by:
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul D. Klemperer, 2007.
"When are Auctions Best?,"
NBER Working Papers
13268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:- Bulow, Jeremy I & Klemperer, Paul, 2007.
"When are Auctions Best?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2007.
"When are Auctions Best?,"
Economics Papers
2007-W03, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
[Downloadable!]
- Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul D., 2007.
"When Are Auctions Best?,"
Research Papers
1973, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
[Downloadable!]
- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2009.
"Managing Strategic Buyers,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
814577000000000059, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2008.
"Managing Strategic Buyers,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1684, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2008.
"Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment,"
Working Papers
08-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Paul Milgrom, 2006.
"Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000503, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- McAdams, David & Schwarz, Michael, 2007.
"Who pays when auction rules are bent?,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1144-1157, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by:
- Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007.
"Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - David McAdams & Michael Schwarz, 2007.
"Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 260-276, March.
[Downloadable!]
- David Mcadams, 2006.
"Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 73(4), pages 1039-1056, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: See citations under working paper version above.
- David McAdams, 2003.
"Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1191-1214, 07.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by:
- Van Zandt, Timothy & Vives, Xavier, 2003.
"Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: - Philip J Reny, 2005.
"On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
784828000000000413, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Mathevet, Laurent, .
"A contraction principle for finite global games,"
Working Papers
1243, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
- Olivier Armantier & Jean-Pierre Florens & Jean-Francois Richard, 2008.
"Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games,"
Journal of Applied Econometrics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 965-981.
[Downloadable!]
- LOVO, Stefano & ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio, 2002.
"On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects,"
Les Cahiers de Recherche
765, HEC Paris.
[Downloadable!]
- Christian Ewerhart & Nuno Cassola & Natacha Valla, 2006.
"Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations,"
Working Paper Series
668, European Central Bank.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro, 2006.
"Pure Strategy Equilibria Of Single And Double Auctions With Interdependent Values,"
Economics Working Papers
we065320, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Mason, Robin & Valentinyi, Ãkos, 2003.
"Independence And Heterogeneity In Games Of Incomplete Information,"
Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
0307, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
[Downloadable!]
- Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Castro Filho, Luciano I. de Castro Filho, 2004.
"Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and Non-monotonic auctions,"
Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE)
571, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-26.
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