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This chapter was published in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, , chapter 08, pages 227-279, 1992.

This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications with number 1-08.

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This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 1992. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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3. Noussair, Charles & Porter, David., 1990. "Allocating Priority with Auctions: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 747, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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   • Noussair, Charles & Porter, David, 1992. "Allocating priority with auctions: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 169-195, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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8. Wilson, William W. & Dahl, Bruce L. & Johnson, D. Demcey, 1999. "Transparency And Bidding Competition In International Wheat Trade," Agricultural Economics Reports 23403, North Dakota State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
9. John Preston, Gerard Whelan, Chris Nash, Mark Wardman, 2000. "The Franchising of Passenger Rail Services in Britain," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 99-112, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. EINY, Ezra & HAIMANKO, Ori & ORZACH, Ram & SELA, Aner, 2001. "Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information," CORE Discussion Papers 2001007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
11. Wilson, William W. & Diersen, Matthew A., 1999. "Competitive Bidding On Import Tenders: The Case Of Minor Oilseeds," Agricultural Economics Reports 23421, North Dakota State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
12. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000604, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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13. EINY, Ezra & HAIMANKO, Ori & ORZACH, Ram & SELA, Aner, 2000. "Information advantage and dominant strategies in second-price auctions," CORE Discussion Papers 2000055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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20. Gino Loyola, 2008. "On bidding markets: the role of competition," Economics Working Papers we083318, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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