We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by a package of anonymous commodity taxes that cause prices to adjust and markets to reclear at different levels of individual consumption. The argument can be extended to economies with strategic interactions, incomplete asset markets or asymmetric information. This constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations might provide a rationale for economic policy in economies with externalities.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Length: 27 pages Date of creation: Aug 2006 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2008), 44: 682-696 Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1576
Find related papers by JEL classification: D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
CITANNA, Alessandro & POLEMARCHAKIS, Herakles M. & TIRELLI, Mario, 2001.
"The taxation of trades in assets,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.