Pareto Improving Taxes
AbstractWe show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by a package of anonymous commodity taxes that cause prices to adjust and markets to reclear at different levels of individual consumption. The argument can be extended to economies with strategic interactions, incomplete asset markets or asymmetric information. This constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations might provide a rationale for economic policy in economies with externalities.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1576.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2008), 44: 682-696
Note: CFP 1235.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- DEBREU, Gérard, .
"Economies with a finite set of equilibria,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-67, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Geanakoplos, J. D. & Polemarchakis, H. M., 1990. "Observability and optimality," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 153-165.
- Guesnerie Roger, 1976.
"On the direction of tax reform,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
- CITANNA, Alessandro & POLEMARCHAKIS, Herakles M. & TIRELLI, Mario, 2001.
"The taxation of trades in assets,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- P. A. Diamond, 1975.
"A Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule,"
146, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Debreu, Gerard, 1972.
Econometric Society, vol. 40(4), pages 603-15, July.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 241-61, April.
- Herakles Polemarchakis, 2001. "The taxation of trades in assests," Working Papers 2001-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Alberto Bisin & John Geanakoplos & Piero Gottardi & Enrico Minelli & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2010.
"Markets and contracts,"
Economics Working Papers
ECO2010/29, European University Institute.
- Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 229-64, May.
- Atsushi Kajii & Antonio Villanacci & Alessandro Citanna, 1998. "Constrained suboptimality in incomplete markets: a general approach and two applications," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 495-521.
- Kenneth Arrow, 1970. "Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities," NBER Chapters, in: The Analysis of Public Output, pages 1-30 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Snyder, Susan K., 1999. "Testable restrictions of Pareto optimal public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 97-119, January.
- Andrés Carvajal, 2003.
"Testable Restrictions og General Equilibrium Theory in Exchange Economies with Externalities,"
BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA
003556, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
- Andrés Carvajal, 2004. "Testable Restrictions of General Equilibrium Theory in Exchange Economies with Externalities," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/28, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Nov 2004.
- Andrés Carvajal, . "Testable Restrictions of General Equilibrium Theory in Exchange Economies with Externalities," Borradores de Economia 231, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
- Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
- repec:fth:louvco:2000/24 is not listed on IDEAS
- Mirrlees, J A, 1999. "The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 3-21, January.
- Debreu, Gerard, 1976. "Smooth Preferences: A Corrigendum," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 831-32, July.
- Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August.
- Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
- repec:fth:louvco:0117 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hurwicz, Leonid, 1973. "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 1-30, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Glena Ames).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.