The theory of general equilibrium was criticized for its apparent lack of testable implications,as seemingly implied by the results of Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu in the Seventies. This view was challenged by the results of Brown and Matzkin (1996) which showed the existence of testable restrictions on the equilibrium manifold of exchange economies. This paper studies a problem similar to the one posed by Brown and Matzkin, for the case of general equilibrium in the presence of externalities. The natural definition of equilibrium in such case is the Nash-Walras equilibrium concept. I first consider the case of strategic externalities, where I assume that each player chooses a consumption bundle, subject to some budget,and a strategy from a continuous domain, and where the utility of each individual depends on his consumption and on the strategies chosen by all the players. I also consider the case of consumption externalities, in which each individual's utility depends on his consumption of all commodities and on the consumption of some particular commodity by all individuals. The results obtained here are rather negative in that they point towards the unfalsiability of the equilibrium hypothesis. Under the assumption that one can observe individual choices for the externality, I find that there exist some extremely mild testable restrictions. This, however, is not a pure extension of the Brown-Matzkin result, since some individual decisions are assumed to be observed. If there is no information on individual choices, I find that the equilibrium concept imposes no testable restrictions. This occurs unless one imposes further assumptions, such as weak separability.
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Paper provided by Banco de la Republica de Colombia in its series Borradores de Economia with number
231.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Ghosal, S. & Polemarchakis, H. M., 1997.
"Nash-Walras equilibria,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 31-40, April.
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GHOSAL, Sayantan & POLEMARCHAKISÊ, Heracles, 1995.
"Nash-Walras equilibria,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1995080, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)