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A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten

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Gul, Faruk

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Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to celebrate the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash, and Reinhard Selten to economics. The emphasis is on tracing the influence of their work on economic analysis rather than giving a detailed account of each of their contributions. The three researchers are identified with the three most important ideas in game theory: equilibrium, asymmetric information, and credibility. These three ideas have dominated not only theoretical research but also numerous other fields within economics since the 1950s. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 11 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
Pages: 159-74
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:11:y:1997:i:3:p:159-74

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dixit, Avinash, 1993. "In Honor of Paul Krugman: Winner of the John Bates Clark Medal," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 173-88, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. van Damme, Eric, 1995. "On the Contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 3-11.
  4. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  7. van Damme, Eric & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995. " Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction: The Contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(1), pages 15-40, March.
  8. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
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  9. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Spence, Michael, 1976. "Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 591-97, November.
  13. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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