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Citations for "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall"

by Rubinstein, Ariel

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  1. Nicola Dimitri, 2005. "Dynamic Consistency in Extensive form Decision Problems," Department of Economics University of Siena 455, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  2. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2004. "Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 119-158, 01.
  3. Geir B. Asheim, 1995. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Discussion Papers 1128, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
  5. Wichardt, Philipp C., 2012. "Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 709-713.
  6. Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2015. "A note on the welfare of a sophisticated time-inconsistent decision-maker," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2015-201, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  7. Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 1999. "Distributed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 55-72, July.
  8. Kalai, Ehud & Solan, Eilon, 2003. "Randomization and simplification in dynamic decision-making," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 251-264, August.
  9. Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "Imperfect memory and choice under risk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 127-158.
  10. John Smith, 2009. "Imperfect Memory and the Preference for Increasing Payments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(4), pages 684-700, December.
  11. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 31-50, July.
  12. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Towards a Theory of Deception," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000247, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Wichardt, Philipp C., 2008. "Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 366-369, May.
  14. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2013. "Imperfect Attention and Menu Evaluations," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-98, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  15. Stefano Ficco & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2004. "Information Overload in Multi-Stage Selection Procedures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-077/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  16. Sumit Agarwal & John C. Driscoll & Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2008. "Learning in the Credit Card Market," NBER Working Papers 13822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Deck, Cary & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2009. "Inducing imperfect recall in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 64-74, January.
  18. Oliver Board, 2003. "The Not-So-Absent-Minded Driver," Economics Series Working Papers 147, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  19. Garicano, Luis & Prat, Andrea, 2011. "Organizational Economics with Cognitive Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 8372, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2003. "A computer scientist looks at game theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 114-131, October.
  21. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2003. "Self-control, revealed preference and consumption choice," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000362, David K. Levine.
  22. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1999. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation," CESifo Working Paper Series 213, CESifo Group Munich.
  23. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 361, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  24. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
  25. Mamoru Kaneko & J. Jude Kline, 2006. "Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 06-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  26. John Ameriks & Andrew Caplin & John Leahy & Tom Tyler, 2004. "Measuring Self-Control," NBER Working Papers 10514, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Forgetful Passenger," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 117-120, July.
  28. Board, Oliver, 2004. "Dynamic interactive epistemology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-80, October.
  29. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1823, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2012.
  30. Sudipta Sarangi & Cary Deck, . "Inducing Absent-Mindedness in the Lab," Departmental Working Papers 2006-09, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
  31. Monte, Daniel, 2014. "Learning with bounded memory in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 204-223.
  32. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Effecting Cooperation," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 29 May 2009.
  33. Jehiel, Philippe & Samet, Dov, 2007. "Valuation equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(2), June.
  34. Ehud Kalai & Eilon Solan, 2000. "Randomization and Simplification," Discussion Papers 1283, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  35. Stefano Ficco & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2004. "Information Overload in Multi-Stage Selection Procedures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-077/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  36. Ruebeck, Christopher S., 1999. "Imitation dynamics in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: an exploratory example," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 81-104, September.
  37. Steffen Huck & Rajiv Sarin, 2000. "Players with Limited Memory," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1645, Econometric Society.
  38. Halpern, Joseph Y., 1997. "On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 66-96, July.
  39. Uwe Dulleck & Joerg Oechssler, 1996. "The Absent-minded Centipede (revision)," Game Theory and Information 9610005, EconWPA, revised 11 Oct 1996.
  40. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000664, UCLA Department of Economics.
  41. Dilger, Alexander, 1998. "The absent-minded prisoner," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 14/1998, Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
  42. John Leahy & Andrew Caplin, 2004. "The Absentminded Consumer," 2004 Meeting Papers 784, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  43. Uwe Dulleck, 2007. "The E-Mail Game Revisited — Modeling Rough Inductive Reasoning," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 323-339.
  44. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2004. "Memory and perfect recall in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 237-256, May.
  45. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2003. "A syntactic characterization of perfect recall in extensive games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 201-217, September.
  46. Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Job Promotion Tournaments and Imperfect Recall," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 112, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  47. Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 102-116, July.
  48. von Stengel, Bernhard & Koller, Daphne, 1997. "Team-Maxmin Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 309-321, October.
  49. Nicola Dimitri, 2009. "Dynamic consistency in extensive form decision problems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(4), pages 345-354, April.
  50. Jean Baratgin & Bernard Walliser, 2010. "Sleeping Beauty and the absent-minded driver," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 489-496, September.
  51. Tirole, Jean, 2002. "Rational irrationality: Some economics of self-management," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 633-655, May.
  52. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2014. "Behavioral Economics of Crime Rates and Punishment Levels," Working Papers 21, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
  53. Oliver Board, 2002. "The Deception of the Greeks: Generalizing the Information Structure of Extensive Form Games," Economics Series Working Papers 137, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  54. Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann, 2009. "Agent connectedness and backward induction," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27000, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  55. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2013. "Large extensive form games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 75-102, January.
  56. John Smith, 2007. "Cognitive Dissonance, Imperfect Memory and the Preference for Increasing Payments," Departmental Working Papers 200705, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  57. Paul Koster & Stefanie Peer & Thijs Dekker, 2014. "Memory, Expectation Formation and Scheduling Choices," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-154/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
  58. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2005. "Trees and Extensive Forms," Vienna Economics Papers 0506, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  59. Mamoru Kaneko & J. Kline, 2013. "Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 27-59, May.
  60. Ahti Pietarinen, 2003. "A Note on the Structural Notion of Information in Extensive Form Games," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 91-98, February.
  61. Huck, S. & Müller, W., 2002. "Absent-minded drivers in the lab : Testing Gilboa's model," Other publications TiSEM d741c924-4e37-40ec-b617-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  62. Stefano Ficco & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2004. "Information Overload in Multi-Stage Selection Procedures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-077/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  63. Oliver Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2010. "Plausible Cooperation, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Jan 2015.
  64. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics.
  65. Wichardt, Philipp C., 2010. "Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 472-487, November.
  66. Segal, Uzi, 2000. "Don't fool yourself to believe you won't fool yourself again," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 1-3, April.
  67. Grove, Adam J. & Halpern, Joseph Y., 1997. "On the Expected Value of Games with Absentmindedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 51-65, July.
  68. Page, Lionel & Page, Katie, 2010. "Last shall be first: A field study of biases in sequential performance evaluation on the Idol series," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 186-198, February.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.