A Category for Extensive-Form Games
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- Peter A. Streufert, 2021. "A Category for Extensive-Form Games," Papers 2105.11398, arXiv.org.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2022-03-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2022-03-14 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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