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Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision

Citations

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As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Preventing bank runs – a primer
    by ? in Bruegel blog on 2013-04-02 15:58:20

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Panagiotis Staikouras & Christos Staikouras & Maria-Eleni Agoraki, 2007. "The effect of board size and composition on European bank performance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-27, February.
  2. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner, 2022. "Bank Supervision," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 39-56, November.
  3. Hamdi, Helmi & Hakimi, Abdelaziz, 2015. "Did banks and financial markets developments lead to economic growth in MENA region? Evidence from Dynamic panel data estimation," MPRA Paper 64310, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Friederike Niepmann & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013. "Bank Bailouts, International Linkages, and Cooperation," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 270-305, November.
  5. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 630-657, September.
  6. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura, 2007. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 640-666, November.
  7. Marcelo Rezende, 2014. "The Effects of Bank Charter Switching on Supervisory Ratings," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-20, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  8. Buch, Claudia M. & Krause, Thomas & Tonzer, Lena, 2019. "Drivers of systemic risk: Do national and European perspectives differ?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 160-176.
  9. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2011. "Regulating the Regulators: The Changing Face of Financial Supervision Architectures Before and After the Financial Crisis," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  10. Alexis Derviz & Jakub Seidler, 2012. "Coordination Incentives in Cross-Border Macroprudential Regulation," Working Papers IES 2012/21, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2012.
  11. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
  12. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Frisell, Lars & Roszbach, Kasper, 2008. "Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 6888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Pierre C. Boyer & Jorge Ponce, 2011. "Central Banks and Banking Supervision Reform," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  14. Pierre C. Boyer & Jorge Ponce, 2010. "Central banks, regulatory capture and banking supervision reform," Documentos de trabajo 2010003, Banco Central del Uruguay.
  15. Morrison, Alan D. & White, Lucy, 2010. "Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance," Working Paper Series 1196, European Central Bank.
  16. Haritchabalet, Carole & Lepetit, Laetitia & Spinassou, Kévin & Strobel, Frank, 2017. "Bank capital regulation: Are local or central regulators better?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 103-114.
  17. Mayes, David G. & Nieto, María J. & Wall, Larry, 2008. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 232-257, September.
  18. Adrian, Tobias & Boyarchenko, Nina, 2018. "Liquidity policies and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 35(PB), pages 45-60.
  19. Ioan Talpos & Bogdan Dima & Mihai Mutascu & Cosmin Enache, 2005. "A New Approach Of The Budget Deficit: An Empirical Analysis," Public Economics 0510023, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Cecile Bastidon & Philippe Gilles & Nicolas Huchet, 2008. "A Selective Bail-Out International Lending of Last Resort Model," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 9(1), pages 103-114, May.
  21. Martin Èihák & Richard Podpiera, 2006. "Is One Watchdog Better than Three? International Experience with Integrated Financial-Sector Supervision (in English)," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 56(3-4), pages 102-126, March.
  22. Totzek, Alexander, 2009. "Banks and early deposit withdrawals in a new Keynesian framework," Economics Working Papers 2009-08, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  23. Bastidon, Cécile & Gilles, Philippe & Huchet, Nicolas, 2008. "The international lender of last resort and selective bail-out," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 144-152, June.
  24. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Nijskens, Rob, 2012. "A dynamic analysis of bank bailouts and constructive ambiguity," CEPR Discussion Papers 8953, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Marcelo Rezende, 2011. "How do joint supervisors examine financial institutions? the case of state banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2011-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  26. Ponce, Jorge & Rennert, Marc, 2015. "Systemic banks and the lender of last resort," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 286-297.
  27. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
  28. Heinrich, Gregor, 2007. "El seguro de depósito dentro de la red de seguridad financiera [Deposit insurance within the financial safety-net]," MPRA Paper 47444, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  29. Nijskens, Rob, 2014. "A sheep in wolf’s clothing: Can a central bank appear tougher than it is?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 94-103.
  30. Xavier Freixas, 2009. "Monetary policy in a systemic crisis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 630-653, Winter.
  31. Rafael Repullo, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(2), September.
  32. Hauck, Achim & Vollmer, Uwe, 2013. "Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 193-204.
  33. Elisabetta Montanaro, 2016. "The process towards centralisation of the European financial supervisory architecture: The case of the Banking Union," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 69(277), pages 135-172.
  34. Rob Nijskens & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2011. "The Lender of Last Resort: Liquidity Provision versus the Possibility of Bailout," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  35. Michael Koetter & Kasper Roszbach & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2014. "Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(4), pages 31-68, December.
  36. Huberto M. Ennis, 2016. "Models of Discount Window Lending: A Review," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 1Q, pages 1-50.
  37. Beck, Thorsten, 2008. "Bank competition and financial stability : friends or foes ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4656, The World Bank.
  38. Ruth Mateos de Cabo & Ricardo Gimeno & María Nieto, 2012. "Gender Diversity on European Banks’ Boards of Directors," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 109(2), pages 145-162, August.
  39. Scheubel, Beatrice & Stracca, Livio, 2019. "What do we know about the global financial safety net? A new comprehensive data set," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
  40. Lavinia Mihaela GUȚU & Vasile ILIE, 2013. "Banking supervision in European Union," SEA - Practical Application of Science, Romanian Foundation for Business Intelligence, Editorial Department, issue 2, pages 121-130, October.
  41. T. To D. & Т. То Д., 2016. "Реструктуризация банковской системы: пример Вьетнама // Restructuring the Banking System: the Case of Vietnam," Review of Business and Economics Studies // Review of Business and Economics Studies, Финансовый Университет // Financial University, vol. 4(4), pages 32-54.
  42. Greg Caldwell, 2005. "An Analysis of Closure Policy under Alternative Regulatory Structures," Staff Working Papers 05-11, Bank of Canada.
  43. repec:zbw:bofitp:2005_007 is not listed on IDEAS
  44. Donato Masciandaro, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Supervision Regimes: Markets, Institutions, Politics, Law or Geography?," Chapters, in: Kern Alexander & Rahul Dhumale (ed.), Research Handbook on International Financial Regulation, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  45. Repullo, Rafael, 2004. "Policies for Banking Crises: A Theoretical Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 4727, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  46. Haritchabalet, Carole & Lepetit, Laetitia & Spinassou, Kévin & Strobel, Frank, 2017. "Bank capital regulation: Are local or central regulators better?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 103-114.
  47. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2007_012 is not listed on IDEAS
  48. König, Philipp Johann & Mayer, Paul & Pothier, David, 2022. "Optimal timing of policy interventions in troubled banks," Discussion Papers 10/2022, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  49. Masciandaro, D. & Nieto, M. & Prast, H.M., 2007. "Financial Governance of Banking Supervision," Other publications TiSEM 65d7ff26-dca3-4da3-86ff-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  50. Freixas, Xavier & Rochet, Jean-Charles & Parigi, Bruno M., 2003. "The lender of last resort: a 21st century approach," Working Paper Series 298, European Central Bank.
  51. Pagès, H. & Santos, J., 2002. "Optimal Supervisory Policies and Depositor-Preferences Laws," Working papers 91, Banque de France.
  52. Diemer, Michael, 2016. "Who should rescue subsidiaries of multinational banks?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 159-174.
  53. Harold Ngalawa & Fulbert Tchana Tchana & Nicola Viegi, 2016. "Banking Instability and Deposit Insurance: The Role of Moral Hazard," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(2), pages 323-350, November.
  54. Karmakar, Sudipto, 2016. "Macroprudential regulation and macroeconomic activity," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 166-178.
  55. International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2020. "Evaluation of Differential Premium Systems for Deposit Insurance," IADI Research Papers 20-06, International Association of Deposit Insurers.
  56. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Nijskens, Rob, 2011. "Complementing Bagehot: Illiquidity and insolvency resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 8603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  57. Anichul Hoque Khan & Hasnat Dewan, 2013. "Who should supervise banks for the banking sector stability?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(17), pages 1531-1537, November.
  58. Jorge Ponce, 2006. "Banking Safety Nets: Information Issues," Documentos de trabajo 2006003, Banco Central del Uruguay.
  59. Morrison, Alan D. & White, Lucy, 2013. "Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 642-658.
  60. Holopainen, Helena, 2007. "Integration of financial supervision," Research Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland.
  61. Marcelo Rezende, 2011. "How Do Joint Supervisors Examine Financial Institutions? The Case of Banks," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  62. Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
  63. Klüh, Ulrich, 2005. "Safety Net Design and Systemic Risk: New Empirical Evidence," Discussion Papers in Economics 662, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  64. Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2011. "Delegation to Independent Regulators and the Ratchet Effect," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0911, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  65. Beck, T.H.L., 2008. "Financial Systems and Economic Development : What Have we Learned?," Other publications TiSEM 40833c09-83c6-447d-a32b-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  66. Holopainen, Helena, 2007. "Integration of financial supervision," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland.
  67. Totzek, Alexander, 2008. "The Bank, the Bank-Run, and the Central Bank: The Impact of Early Deposit Withdrawals in a New Keynesian Framework," Economics Working Papers 2008-20, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  68. Ponce, Jorge, 2010. "Lender of last resort policy: What reforms are necessary?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 188-206, April.
  69. Jorge Ponce & Magdalena Tubio, 2010. "Estabilidad financiera: conceptos básicos," Documentos de trabajo 2010004, Banco Central del Uruguay.
  70. Ken B. Cyree, 2016. "The Effects Of Regulatory Compliance For Small Banks Around Crisis-Based Regulation," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 39(3), pages 215-246, September.
  71. Lambrecht, Bart & Tse, Alex, 2019. "Liquidation, bailout, and bail-in: Insolvency resolution mechanisms and bank lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 13734, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  72. Magdalena Kozińska, 2022. "The non‐payout functions of deposit insurance schemes," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 1749-1768, April.
  73. repec:cmj:journl:y:2013:i:29:gutu is not listed on IDEAS
  74. Stracca, Livio & Scheubel, Beatrice, 2016. "What do we know about the global financial safety net? Rationale, data and possible evolution," Occasional Paper Series 177, European Central Bank.
  75. David G. Mayes & Maria J. Nieto & Larry D. Wall, 2011. "Creating an EU-level supervisor for cross-border banking groups: Issues raised by the U.S. experience with dual banking," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2011-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  76. Matej Marinc & Razvan Vlahu, 2011. "The Economic Perspective of Bank Bankruptcy Law," DNB Working Papers 310, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  77. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  78. Itai Agur, 2009. "What Institutional Structure for the Lender of Last Resort?," DNB Working Papers 200, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  79. Boyer, Pierre C. & Ponce, Jorge, 2012. "Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 206-217.
  80. Morrison, Alan & White, Lucy, 2013. "Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance," CEPR Discussion Papers 9508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  81. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2007_007 is not listed on IDEAS
  82. Ampudia, Miguel & Beck, Thorsten & Beyer, Andreas & Colliard, Jean-Edouard & Leonello, Agnese & Maddaloni, Angela & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "The architecture of supervision," Working Paper Series 2287, European Central Bank.
  83. Maier, Ulf, 2016. "Multinational banks: Supranational resolution regimes and the importance of capital regulation," Discussion Papers in Economics 29630, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  84. Novo Plakalovic, 2008. "The Safety Network System And Prospects For The Appearance Of A Financial Crisis In Bosnia And Herzegovina," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 53(178-179), pages 198-230, July - De.
  85. Mayes, David G. & Nieto, Maria J. & Wall, Larry, 2007. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU : is Prompt Corrective Action a partial solution," Research Discussion Papers 7/2007, Bank of Finland.
  86. Marco A Espinosa-Vega & Mr. Rafael Matta & Mr. Charles M. Kahn & Mr. Juan Sole, 2011. "Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture," IMF Working Papers 2011/193, International Monetary Fund.
  87. Xavier Freixas & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2008. "Lender of Last Resort and Bank Closure Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2286, CESifo.
  88. Marcin Jerzy Michalski & Michael Bowe & Olga Kolokolova, 2016. "Systemic risk, interbank market contagion, and the lender of last resort function," IFC Bulletins chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Combining micro and macro data for financial stability analysis, volume 41, Bank for International Settlements.
  89. Michael Diemer & Uwe Vollmer, 2015. "What makes banking crisis resolution difficult? Lessons from Japan and the Nordic Countries," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(2), pages 251-277, December.
  90. Mayes, David G. & Nieto, María J. & Wall, Larry, 2007. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: is Prompt Corrective Action a partial solution," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 7/2007, Bank of Finland.
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