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Is One Watchdog Better than Three? International Experience with Integrated Financial-Sector Supervision (in English)

  • Martin Èihák

    ()

    (International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.)

  • Richard Podpiera

    ()

    (International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.)

Over the past two decades, there has been a clear trend toward integrating the regulation and supervision of banks, nonbank financial institutions, and securities markets. This paper reviews the international experience with integrated supervision. The authors survey the theoretical arguments for and against the integrated supervisory model, and use data on compliance with international standards to assess the validity of some of these arguments. The find that (i) integration is associated with a higher quality of supervision in insurance and securities and a higher consistency of supervision across sectors, after controlling for level of development; and (ii) integrated supervision is not associated with a significant reduction in supervisory staff.

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Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences in its journal Finance a uver - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 56 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
Pages: 102-126

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Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:56:y:2006:i:3-4:p:102-126
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  1. Udaibir S. Das & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management; The Role of Regulatory Governance," IMF Working Papers 02/163, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2004. "Cooperation in international banking supervision," Working Paper Series 0316, European Central Bank.
  3. Charles M. Kahn & João A.C. Santos, 2001. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and supervision," Proceedings 717, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  4. Richard K. Abrams & Michael Taylor, 2000. "Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision," IMF Working Papers 00/213, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Richard Podpiera, 2004. "Does Compliance with Basel Core Principles Bring Any Measurable Benefits?," IMF Working Papers 04/204, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
  7. repec:dgr:uvatin:20110019 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Udaibir S. Das & Marc Quintyn & Kina Chenard, 2004. "Does Regulatory Governance Matter for Financial System Stability? An Empirical Analysis," IMF Working Papers 04/89, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, 2003. "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002," Macroeconomics 0308006, EconWPA.
  10. Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn & Eva H. G. Hüpkes, 2005. "The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors; Principles and Practice," IMF Working Papers 05/51, International Monetary Fund.
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