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Comparison Models of the Financial Regulation and Supervision: Advantages and Disadvantages

  • Petr Musílek
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    This paper surveys the institutional arrangement of the financial regulation and supervision. Financial markets channel funds from savers to borrowers by expediting the creation and trading of financial instruments. Financial markets consist of numerous smaller financial submarkets that specialize in different types of financial instruments, different types of customers. The future of financial markets can see in the consolidation of the financial institutions. There are four fundamental objectives of financial regulation. The first is to ensure the safety and credibility of the financial institutions. Second, the central bank uses regulation to provide financial stability. The third objective is to provide an efficient and competitive financial system. Finally, financial regulation should protect consumers from abuses by financial institutions. There are many models of the institutional arrangement of the financial regulation and supervision. Financial theory indicates a wide variety of institutional arrangements, suggesting that is no universal ideal model. Model of the regulation and supervision do not guarantee better supervision. More rational structures may help, but, fundamentally, more efficient supervision comes from independent and transparent supervisory body with bettertrained staff and better enforcement, supporting the development of the financial market.

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    Article provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Český finanční a účetní časopis.

    Volume (Year): 2006 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 8-22

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    Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlcfu:v:2006:y:2006:i:4:id:191:p:8-22
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    1. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Jeffrey Carmichael & Alexander Fleming & David Llewellyn, 2004. "Aligning Financial Supervisory Structures with Country Needs," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 14876.
    3. Martin Cihák & Richard Podpiera, 2006. "Is One Watchdog Better Than Three? International Experience with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision," IMF Working Papers 06/57, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Martin Èihák & Richard Podpiera, 2006. "Is One Watchdog Better than Three? International Experience with Integrated Financial-Sector Supervision (in English)," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 56(3-4), pages 102-126, March.
    5. Richard K. Abrams & Michael Taylor, 2000. "Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision," IMF Working Papers 00/213, International Monetary Fund.
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