Training and early Retirement
In this paper we analyze how retirement behavior is affected by a worker’s firm-specific or general training history. Using US data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men and controlling for the effects of technological change and workers’ retirement preferences, we find that workers with a firm-specific training history retire earlier than workers with a general training background. This indicates that shared investments in firm-specific training are embedded in upward sloping earning profiles that create productivity-wage differentials for older workers.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht|
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