Private Pensions and Public Pensions: Theory and Fact
An economic theory of public and private pensions is developed, and the implications of the theory are compared with some empirical evidence, of both the econometric and casual varieties. Among the questions addressed are: why are there private pensions? why have they grown so rapidly in recent decades? why do they have the particular features that they do? why does the government intervene by regulating the provisions of private pensions and mandating a public pension system? what are the effects of private and public pensions on savings and retirement decisions?
|Date of creation:||Jun 1982|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Blinder, Alan S. "Private Pensions and Public Pensions: Thoery and Fact," Dec. 1983, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan|
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- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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