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It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game

Author

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  • Philip J. Grossman
  • Catherine Eckel
  • Mana Komai
  • Wei Zhan

Abstract

We address followers’ gender-based perception of leader’s effectiveness. Our experiment’s design removes factors that might affect leadership success, such as risk-taking and competitiveness. We employ a repeated weakest-link coordination game; 10 periods without a leader and 10 periods after the leader makes a short, “scripted” speech advising followers on how to maximize earnings. Followers then choose a costly bonus for the leader. The leader’s gender is the only variable that changes across sessions. Followers are more likely to heed the advice of the male leaders, are less likely to ascribe success to female leaders, and reward male leaders more.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip J. Grossman & Catherine Eckel & Mana Komai & Wei Zhan, 2017. "It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game," Monash Economics Working Papers 01-17, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2017-01
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    Cited by:

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    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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