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It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game

Listed author(s):
  • Philip J. Grossman
  • Catherine Eckel
  • Mana Komai
  • Wei Zhan

We address followers’ gender-based perception of leader’s effectiveness. Our experiment’s design removes factors that might affect leadership success, such as risk-taking and competitiveness. We employ a repeated weakest-link coordination game; 10 periods without a leader and 10 periods after the leader makes a short, “scripted” speech advising followers on how to maximize earnings. Followers then choose a costly bonus for the leader. The leader’s gender is the only variable that changes across sessions. Followers are more likely to heed the advice of the male leaders, are less likely to ascribe success to female leaders, and reward male leaders more.

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File URL: http://business.monash.edu/economics/research/publications/eco/0117itpaystobeamangrossmaneckelkomaizhan.pdf
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Paper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number 01-17.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2017
Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2017-01
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Department of Economics, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia

Phone: +61-3-9905-2493
Fax: +61-3-9905-5476
Web page: http://business.monash.edu/economics
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