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It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game

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  • Philip J. Grossman
  • Catherine Eckel
  • Mana Komai
  • Wei Zhan

Abstract

This paper addresses followers’ assessment of leaders’ effectiveness in a controlled laboratory environment with salient incentives. We employ a simple game setting to examine how leaders are evaluated for the successes and failures of their groups. Followers participate in a five-person, coordination game repeated for two sets of 10 periods. Followers play each set with a different fixed group. After period 10, a leader provides (scripted) guidance on how to play the game to maximize group earnings. The gender of the leader is the only variable factor. At the end of the twentieth period, followers vote to reward (at a cost to themselves) their leader. We find that, even though leaders are all providing the same guidance, followers are more likely to heed the advice of the male leaders, followers are less likely to ascribe group success to female leaders, and followers reward male leaders more generously than female leaders. There is a premium to being male.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip J. Grossman & Catherine Eckel & Mana Komai & Wei Zhan, 2016. "It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game," Monash Economics Working Papers 38-16, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2016-38
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    2. Catherine Eckel & Lata Gangadharan & Philip J. Grossman & Nina Xue, 2020. "The Gender Leadership Gap: Insights from Experiments," Monash Economics Working Papers 14-20, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    3. Nisvan Erkal & Lata Gangadharan & Boon Han Koh, 2018. "Attribution biases in Leadership: Is it effort or luck ?," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2040, The University of Melbourne.
    4. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2018. "Teamwork, Leadership and Gender," IZA Discussion Papers 11861, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Abel, Martin & Buchman, Daniel, 2020. "The Effect of Manager Gender and Performance Feedback: Experimental Evidence from India," IZA Discussion Papers 13871, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Priyanka Chakraborty & Danila Serra, 2018. "Gender differences in top leadership roles: Does aversion to worker backlash matter?," Departmental Working Papers 1807, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
    7. Nieto, Adrián, 2021. "Native-immigrant differences in the effect of children on the gender pay gap," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 654-680.
    8. Asad, Sher Afghan & Banerjee, Ritwik & Bhattacharya, Joydeep, 2020. "Do workers discriminate against their out-group employers? Evidence from the gig economy," ISU General Staff Papers 202002230800001098, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    9. Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2021. "Female Leadership: Effectiveness And Perception," Working Papers 202103, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    10. Macchiavello, Rocco & Menzel, Andreas & Rabbani, Atonu & Woodruff, Christopher, 2020. "Challenges of Change: An Experiment Promoting Women to Managerial Roles in the Bangladeshi Garment Sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 15085, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Geraldine Guarin & J. Jobu Babin, 2021. "Collaboration and Gender Focality in Stag Hunt Bargaining," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 12(2), pages 1-7, May.
    12. Ernesto Reuben & Krisztina Timko, 2018. "On the effectiveness of elected male and female leaders and team coordination," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(2), pages 123-135, December.
    13. Abel, Martin, 2019. "Do Workers Discriminate against Female Bosses?," IZA Discussion Papers 12611, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Kerstin Grosch & Stephan Müller & Holger A. Rau & Lilia Zhurakhovska, 2020. "Selection into Leadership and Dishonest Behavior of Leaders: A Gender Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 8514, CESifo.
    15. Baiba Renerte & Jan Hausfeld & Torsten Twardawski, 2020. "Gender, overconfidence, and optimal group composition for investment decisions," TWI Research Paper Series 121, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Leadership; Gender; Coordination Game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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