Within-Team Competition In The Minimum Effort Coordination Game
We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within-team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where the pay-off-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects from polarizing both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Volume (Year): 11 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
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