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Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy with Endogenous Collateral Constraints

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  • Woodford, Michael
  • Araujo, Aloisio
  • Schommer, Susan

Abstract

We consider the effects of central-bank purchases of a risky asset, financed by issuing riskless nominal liabilities (reserves), as an additional dimension of policy alongside ?conventional? monetary policy (central-bank control of the riskless nominal interest rate), in a general-equilibrium model of asset pricing and risk sharing with endogenous collateral constraints of the kind proposed by Geanakoplos (1997). When sufficient collateral exists for collateral constraints not to bind for any agents, we show that central-bank asset purchases have no effects on either real or nominal variables, despite the differing risk characteristics of the assets purchased and the ones issued to finance these purchases. At the same time, the existence of collateral constraints allows our model to capture the common view that large enough central-bank purchases would eventually have to effect asset prices. But even when central-bank purchases raise the price of the asset, owing to binding collateral constraints, the effects need not be the ones commonly assumed. We show that under some circumstances, central-bank purchases relax financial constraints, increase aggregate demand, and may even achieve a Pareto improvement; but in other cases, they may tighten financial constraints, reduce aggregate demand, and lower welfare. The latter case is almost certainly the one that arises if central-bank purchases are sufficiently large.

Suggested Citation

  • Woodford, Michael & Araujo, Aloisio & Schommer, Susan, 2014. "Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy with Endogenous Collateral Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 9995, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9995
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    Cited by:

    1. Cúrdia, Vasco & Woodford, Michael, 2016. "Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 30-65.
    2. Stefan Homburg, 2017. "Understanding Benign Liquidity Traps: The Case of Japan," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 18(3), pages 267-282, August.
    3. Pierpaolo Benigno & Salvatore Nisticò, 2020. "Non-neutrality of Open-Market Operations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 175-226, July.
    4. Aloisio Araujo, 2015. "General equilibrium, preferences and financial institutions after the crisis," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(2), pages 217-254, February.
    5. A. Mantovi & G. Tagliavini, 2017. "Liquidity cognition and limits of arbitrage," Economics Department Working Papers 2017-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
    6. Cycon, Lisa & Koetter, Michael, 2015. "Monetary policy under the microscope: Intra-bank transmission of asset purchase programs of the ECB," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112831, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Hoelle Matthew, 2018. "Optimal Term Structure in a Monetary Economy with Incomplete Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-26, January.
    8. Azariadis, Costas & Bullard, James & Singh, Aarti & Suda, Jacek, 2019. "Incomplete credit markets and monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 83-101.
    9. Howard Kung & Gonzalo Morales & Alexandre Corhay, 2017. "Fiscal Discount Rates and Debt Maturity," 2017 Meeting Papers 840, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Seppo Honkapohja, 2016. "Monetary policies to counter the zero interest rate: an overview of research," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 235-256, May.
    11. Schabert, Andreas, 2014. "Optimal monetary policy, asset purchases, and credit market frictions," Working Paper Series 1738, European Central Bank.
    12. Matthew Hoelle, 2018. "Stationary inflation and Pareto efficiency with incomplete markets and a large open economy," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(1), pages 115-128, April.
    13. Claudio Borio & Anna Zabai, 2018. "Unconventional monetary policies: a re-appraisal," Chapters, in: Peter Conti-Brown & Rosa M. Lastra (ed.), Research Handbook on Central Banking, chapter 20, pages 398-444, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Hanming Fang & Yongqin Wang & Xian Wu, 2020. "The Collateral Channel of Monetary Policy: Evidence from China," PIER Working Paper Archive 20-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    15. Li Lin & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos & Alexandros P. Vardoulakis, 2019. "Debt deflation effects of monetary policy," Chapters, in: Financial Regulation and Stability, chapter 9, pages 245-258, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. André, Marine Charlotte & Dai, Meixing, 2017. "Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 281-296.
    17. James B. Bullard & Aarti Singh, 2016. "Incomplete Credit Markets and Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Labor Supply : a presentation at Bank of Korea 2016 Conference, Employment and Growth, Seoul, Korea, May 30, 2016," Speech 270, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    18. Carvalho, Jaimilton & Orrillo, Jaime & da Silva, Fernanda Rocha Gomes, 2020. "Probability of default in collateralized credit operations for small business," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    19. Aloisio Araujo & Liev Maribondo & Susan Schommer, 2018. "Heterogeneous expectations, collateral constraints and unconventional monetary policy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2064-2072.
    20. Abeer Reza & Eric Santor & Lena Suchanek, 2015. "Quantitative Easing as a Policy Tool Under the Effective Lower Bound," Discussion Papers 15-14, Bank of Canada.
    21. Iraola, Miguel A. & Sepúlveda, Fabián & Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo, 2019. "Financial segmentation and collateralized debt in infinite-horizon economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 56-69.
    22. Angelo Ranaldo & Benedikt Ballensiefen & Hannah Winterberg, 2020. "Monetary policy disconnect," Working Papers on Finance 2003, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    23. Geanakoplos, John, 2014. "Leverage, Default, and Forgiveness: Lessons from the American and European Crises," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 313-333.
    24. Andreas Schabert, 2017. "Welfare-Enhancing Distributional Effects of Central Bank Asset Purchases," Working Paper Series in Economics 94, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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