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Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy with Endogenous Collateral Constraints

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  • Aloísio Araújo
  • Susan Schommer
  • Michael Woodford

Abstract

We consider the effects of central bank purchases of a risky asset as an additional dimension of policy alongside "conventional" interest rate policy in a general-equilibrium model of asset pricing with endogenous collateral constraints. The effects of asset purchases depend on the way that they affect collateral constraints. We show that under some circumstances, central bank purchases relax financial constraints, increase aggregate demand, and may even achieve a Pareto improvement; but in other cases, they tighten financial constraints, reduce aggregate demand, and lower welfare. The latter case is almost certainly the one that arises if central bank purchases are sufficiently large. (JEL D51, E43, E44, E52, E58)

Suggested Citation

  • Aloísio Araújo & Susan Schommer & Michael Woodford, 2015. "Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy with Endogenous Collateral Constraints," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 1-43, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:7:y:2015:i:1:p:1-43
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.20140002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Li Lin & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos & Alexandros P. Vardoulakis, 2019. "Debt deflation effects of monetary policy," Chapters, in: Financial Regulation and Stability, chapter 9, pages 245-258, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Aloisio Araujo & Liev Maribondo & Susan Schommer, 2018. "Heterogeneous expectations, collateral constraints and unconventional monetary policy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2064-2072.
    3. Seppo Honkapohja, 2016. "Monetary policies to counter the zero interest rate: an overview of research," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 235-256, May.
    4. Schabert, Andreas, 2014. "Optimal monetary policy, asset purchases, and credit market frictions," Working Paper Series 1738, European Central Bank.
    5. Cúrdia, Vasco & Woodford, Michael, 2016. "Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 30-65.
    6. Claudio Borio & Anna Zabai, 2018. "Unconventional monetary policies: a re-appraisal," Chapters, in: Peter Conti-Brown & Rosa M. Lastra (ed.), Research Handbook on Central Banking, chapter 20, pages 398-444, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Abeer Reza & Eric Santor & Lena Suchanek, 2015. "Quantitative Easing as a Policy Tool Under the Effective Lower Bound," Discussion Papers 15-14, Bank of Canada.
    8. Stefan Homburg, 2017. "Understanding Benign Liquidity Traps: The Case of Japan," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 18(3), pages 267-282, August.
    9. Hanming Fang & Yongqin Wang & Xian Wu, 2020. "The Collateral Channel of Monetary Policy: Evidence from China," NBER Working Papers 26792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Pierpaolo Benigno & Salvatore Nisticò, 2020. "Non-neutrality of Open-Market Operations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 175-226, July.
    11. Aloisio Araujo, 2015. "General equilibrium, preferences and financial institutions after the crisis," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(2), pages 217-254, February.
    12. André, Marine Charlotte & Dai, Meixing, 2017. "Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 281-296.
    13. Iraola, Miguel A. & Sepúlveda, Fabián & Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo, 2019. "Financial segmentation and collateralized debt in infinite-horizon economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 56-69.
    14. James B. Bullard & Aarti Singh, 2016. "Incomplete Credit Markets and Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Labor Supply : a presentation at Bank of Korea 2016 Conference, Employment and Growth, Seoul, Korea, May 30, 2016," Speech 270, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    15. Azariadis, Costas & Bullard, James & Singh, Aarti & Suda, Jacek, 2019. "Incomplete credit markets and monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 83-101.
    16. Angelo Ranaldo & Benedikt Ballensiefen & Hannah Winterberg, 2020. "Monetary policy disconnect," Working Papers on Finance 2003, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    17. A. Mantovi & G. Tagliavini, 2017. "Liquidity cognition and limits of arbitrage," Economics Department Working Papers 2017-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
    18. Cycon, Lisa & Koetter, Michael, 2015. "Monetary policy under the microscope: Intra-bank transmission of asset purchase programs of the ECB," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112831, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Matthew Hoelle, 2018. "Stationary inflation and Pareto efficiency with incomplete markets and a large open economy," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(1), pages 115-128, April.
    20. Geanakoplos, John, 2014. "Leverage, Default, and Forgiveness: Lessons from the American and European Crises," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 313-333.
    21. Hoelle Matthew, 2018. "Optimal Term Structure in a Monetary Economy with Incomplete Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-26, January.
    22. Carvalho, Jaimilton & Orrillo, Jaime & da Silva, Fernanda Rocha Gomes, 2020. "Probability of default in collateralized credit operations for small business," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    23. Andreas Schabert, 2017. "Welfare-Enhancing Distributional Effects of Central Bank Asset Purchases," Working Paper Series in Economics 94, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    24. Howard Kung & Gonzalo Morales & Alexandre Corhay, 2017. "Fiscal Discount Rates and Debt Maturity," 2017 Meeting Papers 840, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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    1. Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy with Endogenous Collateral Constraints (AEJ:MA 2015) in ReplicationWiki

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