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Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy with Endogenous Collateral Constraints

In: Lessons from the Financial Crisis for Monetary Policy


  • Aloísio Araújo
  • Susan Schommer
  • Michael Woodford


We consider the effects of central bank purchases of a risky asset as an additional dimension of policy alongside "conventional" interest rate policy in a general-equilibrium model of asset pricing with endogenous collateral constraints. The effects of asset purchases depend on the way that they affect collateral constraints. We show that under some circumstances, central bank purchases relax financial constraints, increase aggregate demand, and may even achieve a Pareto improvement; but in other cases, they tighten financial constraints, reduce aggregate demand, and lower welfare. The latter case is almost certainly the one that arises if central bank purchases are sufficiently large. (JEL D51, E43, E44, E52, E58)
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Suggested Citation

  • Aloísio Araújo & Susan Schommer & Michael Woodford, 2013. "Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy with Endogenous Collateral Constraints," NBER Chapters,in: Lessons from the Financial Crisis for Monetary Policy National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:13305

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Aloisio Araújo & Jaime Orrillo & Mario R. Páscoa, 2000. "Equilibrium with Default and Endogenous Collateral," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21.
    2. Aloisio Araujo & Mário Rui Páscoa & Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, 2002. "Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1613-1638, July.
    3. Cúrdia, Vasco & Woodford, Michael, 2011. "The central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of monetarypolicy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 54-79, January.
    4. Araújo, Aloísio & Kubler, Felix & Schommer, Susan, 2012. "Regulating collateral-requirements when markets are incomplete," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(2), pages 450-476.
    5. Wallace, Neil, 1981. "A Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Open-Market Operations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 267-274, June.
    6. Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2009. "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 77-100, Winter.
    7. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012. "Securitized banking and the run on repo," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
    8. David Bowman & Etienne Gagnon & Michael P. Leahy, 2010. "Interest on excess reserves as a monetary policy instrument: the experience of foreign central banks," International Finance Discussion Papers 996, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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    Cited by:

    1. Cúrdia, Vasco & Woodford, Michael, 2016. "Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 30-65.
    2. A. Mantovi & G. Tagliavini, 2017. "Liquidity cognition and limits of arbitrage," Economics Department Working Papers 2017-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
    3. Cycon, Lisa & Koetter, Michael, 2015. "Monetary policy under the microscope: Intra-bank transmission of asset purchase programs of the ECB," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112831, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Azariadis, Costas & Bullard, James & Singh, Aarti & Suda, Jacek, 2015. "Incomplete Credit Markets and Monetary Policy," Working Papers 2015-12, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised Feb 2017.
    5. Howard Kung & Gonzalo Morales & Alexandre Corhay, 2017. "Fiscal Discount Rates and Debt Maturity," 2017 Meeting Papers 840, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Seppo Honkapohja, 2016. "Monetary policies to counter the zero interest rate: an overview of research," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 235-256, May.
    7. Schabert, Andreas, 2014. "Optimal monetary policy, asset purchases, and credit market frictions," Working Paper Series 1738, European Central Bank.
    8. repec:bla:germec:v:18:y:2017:i:3:p:267-282 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Benigno, Pierpaolo & Nisticò, Salvatore, 2015. "Non-Neutrality of Open-Market Operations," CEPR Discussion Papers 10594, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. André, Marine Charlotte & Dai, Meixing, 2017. "Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 281-296.
    11. Bullard, James B. & Singh, Aarti, 2016. "Incomplete Credit Markets and Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Labor Supply : a presentation at Bank of Korea 2016 Conference, Employment and Growth, Seoul, Korea, May 30, 2016," Speech 270, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    12. Lin, Li & Tsomocos, Dimitrios P. & Vardoulakis, Alexandros P., 2015. "Debt deflation effects of monetary policy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 81-94.
    13. Stefan Homburg, 2017. "Understanding Benign Liquidity Traps: The Case of Japan," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 18(3), pages 267-282, August.
    14. Azariadis, Costas & Bullard, James B. & Singh, Aarti & Suda, Jacek, 2015. "Optimal Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound," Working Papers 2015-10, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    15. Abeer Reza & Eric Santor & Lena Suchanek, 2015. "Quantitative Easing as a Policy Tool Under the Effective Lower Bound," Discussion Papers 15-14, Bank of Canada.
    16. Claudio Borio & Anna Zabai, 2016. "Unconventional monetary policies: a re-appraisal," BIS Working Papers 570, Bank for International Settlements.
    17. Geanakoplos, John, 2014. "Leverage, Default, and Forgiveness: Lessons from the American and European Crises," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 313-333.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies


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