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Non-Neutrality of Open-Market Operations

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Benigno, Pierpaolo
  • Nisticò, Salvatore

Abstract

Unconventional open-market operations can have consequences for inflation and output because of income losses on central-bank balance sheet. A proposition of neutrality holds under some special monetary and fiscal policy regimes in which the treasury is ready to cover central bank's losses through appropriate transfers levied as taxes on the private sector. In absence of treasury's support, large and recurrent central bank's losses can undermine its long-run solvency and should be resolved through a prolonged increase in inflation. Small and infrequent losses can be absorbed by future retained earnings without any further consequences on prices. A central bank averse to declining net worth commits to a more inflationary stance and delayed exit strategy from a liquidity trap. In absence of taxpayers' support, it is also desirable to increase inflation to the end of reducing the duration of central bank's losses.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 10594.

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Date of creation: May 2015
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10594
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Keywords: central bank's balance sheet; QE; unconventional monetary policy;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General

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Cited by:

  1. Ricardo Reis, 2016. "Funding Quantitative Easing to Target Inflation," Discussion Papers 1626, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
  2. Ricardo Reis, 2016. "Can the Central Bank Alleviate Fiscal Burdens?," NBER Working Papers 23014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Amador, Manuel & Bianchi, Javier & Bocola, Luigi & Perri, Fabrizio, 2016. "Reverse speculative attacks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 125-137.

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