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Different Types of Central Bank Insolvency and the Central Role of Seignorage

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  • Ricardo Reis

Abstract

A central bank is insolvent if its plans imply a Ponzi scheme on reserves so the price level becomes infinity. If the central bank enjoys fiscal support, in the form of a dividend rule that pays out net income every period, including when it is negative, it can never become insolvent independently of the fiscal authority. Otherwise, this note distinguishes between intertemporal insolvency, rule insolvency, and period insolvency. While period and rule solvency depend on analyzing dividend rules and sources of risk to net income, evaluating intertemporal solvency requires overcoming the difficult challenge of measuring the present value of seignorage.

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  • Ricardo Reis, 2015. "Different Types of Central Bank Insolvency and the Central Role of Seignorage," NBER Working Papers 21226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21226
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marvin Goodfriend, 2014. "Monetary Policy as a Carry Trade," IMES Discussion Paper Series 14-E-08, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ricardo Reis, 2016. "Funding Quantitative Easing to Target Inflation," Discussion Papers 1626, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    2. Ricardo Reis, 2017. "QE in the Future: The Central Bank’s Balance Sheet in a Fiscal Crisis," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 65(1), pages 71-112, April.
    3. Ricardo Reis, 2016. "Can the Central Bank Alleviate Fiscal Burdens?," Discussion Papers 1701, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    4. Caballero, Diego & Lucas, André & Schwaab, Bernd & Zhang, Xin, 2020. "Risk endogeneity at the lender/investor-of-last-resort," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 283-297.
    5. Martin Hellwig, 2019. "Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle? – Zur deutschen Diskussion um die Europäische Währungsunion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    6. Bagus, Philipp & Howden, David, 2016. "Central Bank Balance Sheet Analysis," MPRA Paper 79801, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Atsushi Tanaka, 2018. "Monetary Base Controllability after an Exit from Quantitative Easing," Discussion Paper Series 181, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jul 2018.
    8. Favaretto, Federico & Masciandaro, Donato, 2016. "Doves, hawks and pigeons: Behavioral monetary policy and interest rate inertia," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 50-58.
    9. Augustin, Patrick & Chernov, Mikhail & Schmid, Lukas & Song, Dongo, 2019. "Benchmark interest rates when the government is risky," CEPR Discussion Papers 14105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Jean Barthélemy & Guillaume Plantin, "undated". "Fiscal and Monetary Regimes: A Strategic Approach," Working papers 742, Banque de France.
    11. Pierpaolo Benigno & Salvatore Nisticò, 2020. "Non-neutrality of Open-Market Operations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 175-226, July.
    12. Atsushi Tanaka, 2020. "Monetary Base Controllability after an Exit from Quantitative Easing," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 9(3), pages 123-134.
    13. Mikhail Chernov & Lukas Schmid & Andres Schneider, 2020. "A Macrofinance View of U.S. Sovereign CDS Premiums," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(5), pages 2809-2844, October.
    14. Fujiki, Hiroshi & Tomura, Hajime, 2017. "Fiscal cost to exit quantitative easing: the case of Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-11.
    15. M. Kasongo Kashama, 2016. "Helicopter money and debt-financed fiscal stimulus : one and the same thing ?," Economic Review, National Bank of Belgium, issue iii, pages 31-40, December.
    16. Harrison, Richard & Thomas, Ryland, 2019. "Monetary financing with interest-bearing money," Bank of England working papers 785, Bank of England.
    17. Maarten van Rooij & Jakob de Haan, 2016. "Will helicopter money be spent? New evidence," DNB Working Papers 538, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    18. Atsushi Tanaka, 2019. "How Can a Central Bank Exit Quantitative Easing Without Rapidly Shrinking its Balance Sheet?," Discussion Paper Series 196, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
    19. Magill, Michael & Quinzii, Martine & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2020. "The safe asset, banking equilibrium, and optimal central bank monetary, prudential and balance-sheet policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 113-128.
    20. Atsushi Tanaka, 2020. "Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey," Discussion Paper Series 208, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised May 2020.
    21. Hess Chung & Etienne Gagnon & Taisuke Nakata & Matthias Paustian & Bernd Schlusche & James Trevino & Diego Vilán & Wei Zheng, 2020. "Monetary Policy Options at the Effective Lower Bound: Assessing the Federal Reserve’s Current Policy Toolkit," CARF F-Series CARF-F-483, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other

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