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Central Bank Balance Sheet, Liquidity Trap, and Quantitative Easing

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  • Arthur Galego Mendes

    (Department of Economics PUC-Rio)

  • Tiago Couto Berriel

    (Department of Economics PUC-Rio)

Abstract

We show that, when a central bank is not fully financially backed by the treasury and faces a solvency constraint, an increase in the size or a change in the composition of it’s balance sheet (quantitative easing) can serve as a commitment device in a liquidity trap scenario. In particular, when the short-term interest rate is in zero lower bound, open market operations by the central bank that involve purchases of long-term bonds can help mitigate deflation and recession under a discretionary policy equilibrium. This change in central bank balance sheet, which increases its size and duration, provides an incentive to the central bank to keep interest rates low in future in order to avoid losses and satisfy its solvency constraints, approximating its full commitment policy.Creation-Date: 2015-05-08

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur Galego Mendes & Tiago Couto Berriel, "undated". "Central Bank Balance Sheet, Liquidity Trap, and Quantitative Easing," Textos para discussão 638, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    • Handle: RePEc:rio:texdis:638
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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Cavallo & Marco Del Negro & W. Scott Frame & Jamie Grasing & Benjamin A. Malin & Carlo Rosa, 2019. "Fiscal Implications of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Normalization," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 15(5), pages 255-306, December.
    2. Taisuke Nakata & Takeki Sunakawa, 2019. "Credible Forward Guidance," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-037, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/713kqq1pgu80lr8fn0lsuuh8lf is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Xiaoyu Zhang & Fanghui Pan, 2019. "The Dependence of China’s Monetary Policy Rules on Interest Rate Regimes: Empirical Analysis Based on a Pseudo Output Gap," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(9), pages 1-15, May.
    5. Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, 2019. "Gradualism and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 182-199, January.
    6. Barthélemy, Jean & Mengus, Eric, 2018. "The signaling effect of raising inflation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 488-516.
    7. Gauti Eggertsson & Bulat Gafarov & Saroj Bhatarai, 2014. "Time Consistency and the Duration of Government Debt: A Signalling Theory of Quantitative Easing," 2014 Meeting Papers 1292, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Robert E. Hall & Ricardo Reis, 2015. "Maintaining Central-Bank Financial Stability under New-Style Central Banking," NBER Working Papers 21173, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, 2019. "Gradualism and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 182-199, January.
    10. Igor Goncharov & Vasso Ioannidou & Martin C. Schmalz, 2020. "(Why) do central banks care about their profits?," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 018, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    11. Timothy S. Hills & Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Fiscal Multipliers at the Zero Lower Bound: The Role of Policy Inertia," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(1), pages 155-172, February.
    12. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/713kqq1pgu80lr8fn0lsuuh8lf is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Atsushi Tanaka, 2021. "Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(2), pages 249-262, June.
    14. Fernando M. Duarte & Benjamin K. Johannsen & Leonardo Melosi & Taisuke Nakata, 2020. "Strengthening the FOMC’s Framework in View of the Effective Lower Bound and Some Considerations Related to Time-Inconsistent Strategies," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-067, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    15. Igor Goncharov & Vasso Ioannidou & Martin C. Schmalz, 2017. "(Why) Do Central Banks Care About Their Profits?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6546, CESifo.
    16. Atsushi Tanaka, 2019. "How Can a Central Bank Exit Quantitative Easing Without Rapidly Shrinking its Balance Sheet?," Discussion Paper Series 196, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
    17. Ricardo Reis, 2015. "Different Types of Central Bank Insolvency and the Central Role of Seignorage," NBER Working Papers 21226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Atsushi Tanaka, 2020. "Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey," Discussion Paper Series 208, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised May 2020.

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