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Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning ?

Author

Listed:
  • Marine Charlotte André

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Meixing Dai

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In a New Keynesian model, we consider the delegation problem of the government when the central bank optimally sets discretionary monetary policy taking account of private expectations formed through adaptive learning. Learning gives rise to an incentive for the central bank to accommodate less the effect of inflation expectations and cost-push shocks on inflation and induces thus a deviation from rational expectations equilibrium. However, discretionary monetary policy under learning suffers from an excessively low stabilization bias. To improve the social welfare, the government should appoint a liberal central banker, i.e., set a negative optimal inflation penalty that decreases with the value of learning coefficient. The main conclusions are valid under both constant- and decreasing-gain learning.

Suggested Citation

  • Marine Charlotte André & Meixing Dai, 2017. "Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning ?," Post-Print hal-02167169, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02167169
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.10.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Dayu & Xu, Ning & Zhao, Tingting & Song, Yang, 2018. "Identifying the nonlinear correlation between business cycle and monetary policy rule: Evidence from China and the U.S," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 45-54.
    2. André Marine Charlotte & Dai Meixing, 2018. "Learning, robust monetary policy and the merit of precaution," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-20, June.
    3. Marine Charlotte André & Meixing Dai, 2017. "Can inflation contract discipline central bankers when agents are learning?," Working Papers of BETA 2017-25, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    4. André Marine Charlotte & Medina Espidio Sebastián, 2022. "Optimal Robust Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy," Working Papers 2022-17, Banco de México.
    5. Marine Charlotte André & Meixing Dai, 2018. "The limits to robust monetary policy in a small open economy with learning agents," Working Papers of BETA 2018-45, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    6. André, Marine Charlotte & Espidio, Sebastián Medina, 2024. "Optimal robust monetary policy in a small open emerging-market economy," Latin American Journal of Central Banking (previously Monetaria), Elsevier, vol. 5(4).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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