Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C71: Cooperative Games

1999

• Sergiu Hart & Zohar Levy, 1999, "Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 67, issue 4, pages 909-912, July.
• Hamiache, Gerard, 1999, "A Value with Incomplete Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 1, pages 59-78, January.
• Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999, "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 2, pages 286-336, January.
• Gomes, Armando & Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1999, "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 2, pages 204-228, May.
• McLaren, John, 1999, "Supplier relations and the market context: A theory of handshakes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 48, issue 1, pages 121-138, June.
• Sherstyuk, Katerina, 1999, "Team selection with asymmetric agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 38, issue 4, pages 421-452, April.
• Vohra, Rajiv, 1999, "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 86, issue 1, pages 123-147, May.
• Friedman, Eric & Moulin, Herve, 1999, "Three Methods to Share Joint Costs or Surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 87, issue 2, pages 275-312, August.
• Hamiache, Gerard, 1999, "A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 37, issue 3, pages 281-305, May.
• F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1999, "A note on the incentive compatible core," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-02.
• F. Forges & A. Heifetz & E. Minelli, 1999, "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-06.
• O. Gossner, 1999, "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-07.
• F. Chantreuil & A. Trannoy, 1999, "Inequality decomposition values : the trade-off between marginality and consistency," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-24.
• Svendsen, G.L.H. & Svendsen, G.T., 1999, "Social Capital in Rural Denmark," Papers, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics, number 99-13.
• Fougeres, A. & Truffert, A. & Ventou, M., 1999, "Dualite probabiliste des jeux cooperatifs: la "stabilite" comme principe d'equilibre; determination algorithmique du nucleolus," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 99a19.
• Hamiache, G., 1999, "Associated Consistency and Shapley Value," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 99a52.
• Moreau, N., 1999, "Approches pluri-decisionnelles de la famille: rappels theoriques et test empiriques," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 99b08.
• Moreau, N., 1999, "Une application d'un modele collectif d'offres de travail sur donnees francaises," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 99b09.
• Lefebvre, I., 1999, "A General Nonemptiness Result of the Core of a Production Economy with Asymmetric Information," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1999.61.
• Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999, "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 99-06.
• Gossner, O., 1999, "Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 99-07.
• Chantreuil, F. & Trannoy, A., 1999, "Inequality Decomposition Values: the Trade-Off Between Marginality and Consistency," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 99-24.
• Perez-Castrillo, D. & Wettstein, D., 1999, "Bidding for the Surplus: a Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value. ation," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 24-99.
• Frederic Chantreuil & Alain Trannoy, 1999, "Inequality decomposition values : the trade-off between marginality and consistency," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01594025.
• Ulrich Schwalbe, 1999, "The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 70, issue 2, pages 155-185, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF01224767.
• Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 1999, "Stable Voting Procedures for Committees in Economic Environments," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 99-20, Jul.
• Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 1999, "Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 99-21, Mar.
• Téjédo, Cyril & Truchon, Michel, 1999, "Multi-Product Serial Cost Sharing: an Incompatibility Result," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 9919.
• Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 1999, "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 6936, Feb.
• David Levinson, 1999, "Tolling at a Frontier: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers, University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group, number 199904.
• Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999, "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij, number 011, Nov.
• Jingang Zhao, 1999, "The Core in Oligopoly Market with Indivisibility," Working Papers, Ohio State University, Department of Economics, number 99-07, Jun.
• Marco Mariotti, 1999, "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 66, issue 3, pages 733-741.
• José Zarzuelo & Marco Slikker & Flip Klijn, 1999, "Characterizations of a multi-choice value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 28, issue 4, pages 521-532.
• Marc Roubens & Michel Grabisch, 1999, "An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 28, issue 4, pages 547-565.
• M. Angeles de Frutos, 1999, "Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 3, pages 255-272.
• M.J. Albizuri & J.C. Santos & J.M. Zarzuelo, 1999, "Solutions for cooperative games with r alternatives," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 4, pages 345-356.
• van den Brink, J.R., 1999, "An Axiomatization of the Shapley Value Using a Fairness Property," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-120.
• Montero, M.P., 1999, "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-121.
• Bjorndal, E. & Koster, M.A.L. & Tijs, S.H., 1999, "Weighted Allocation Rules for Standard Fixed Tree Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-79.
• Meca-Martinez, A. & Timmer, J.B. & Garcia-Jurado, I. & Borm, P.E.M., 1999, "Inventory Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-53.
• Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Vermeulen, D., 1999, "On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-111.
• Fershtman, C. & Pakes, A., 1999, "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-48.
• Slikker, M., 1999, "Link Monotonic Allocation Schemes," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-06.
• Timmer, J.B. & Llorca, N. & Tijs, S.H., 1999, "Games Arising from Infinite Production Situations," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-57.
• Borm, P.E.M. & Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Sánchez, E. & Voorneveld, M., 1999, "On the Convexity of Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Due Dates," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-49.
• Gilles, R.P. & Owen, G., 1999, "Cooperative Games and Disjunctive Permission Structures," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-20.
• Slikker, M., 1999, "Coalition Formation and Potential Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-83.
• Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J., 1999, "On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-43.
• Koster, M.A.L., 1999, "Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-107.
• Klijn, F. & Tijs, S.H. & Hamers, H.J.M., 1999, "Balancedness of Permutation Games and Envy-Free Allocations in Indivisible Good Economies," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-21.
• van den Brink, J.R. & van der Laan, G., 1999, "Core Concepts for Share Vectors," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-64.
• Ruys, P.H.M. & van den Brink, J.R. & Semenov, R., 1999, "Values and Governance Systems," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-66.
• Suijs, J.P.M., 1999, "Price Uncertainty in Linear Production Situations," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-91.
• van den Brink, J.R. & Ruys, P.H.M. & Semenov, R., 1999, "Governance of Clubs and Firms with Cultural Dimensions," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-101.
• Suijs, J.P.M., 1999, "Insurance Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-95.
• Klijn, F. & Vermeulen, D. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J., 1999, "Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-110.
• van den Brink, J.R. & van der Laan, G., 1999, "Potentials and Reduced Games for Share Functions," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-41.
• Montero, M.P., 1999, "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 125b271e-7a2b-4123-823d-8.
• Meca-Martinez, A. & Timmer, J.B. & Garcia-Jurado, I. & Borm, P.E.M., 1999, "Inventory Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 21f26b3f-7fae-4f19-908f-a.
• Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Vermeulen, D., 1999, "On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 24d16e9c-4dab-4284-8b39-f.
• Fershtman, C. & Pakes, A., 1999, "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 267a33b7-1821-400b-8cc1-9.
• Borm, P.E.M. & Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Sánchez, E. & Voorneveld, M., 1999, "On the Convexity of Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Due Dates," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 46a07ce4-57fe-4a08-bcb5-c.
• Klijn, F. & Tijs, S.H. & Hamers, H.J.M., 1999, "Balancedness of Permutation Games and Envy-Free Allocations in Indivisible Good Economies," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 7a24fce2-14e6-4670-8dbb-8.
• van den Brink, J.R. & van der Laan, G., 1999, "Core Concepts for Share Vectors," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 7b3a5d55-7e46-4144-8423-6.
• Klijn, F. & Vermeulen, D. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J., 1999, "Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b9f5b0ab-bfc5-4ad3-a4ba-8.
• Guillaume HAERINGER, 1999, "A New Weight Scheme for the Shapley Value," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 9910.
• Leech, Dennis, 1999, "Minority Control: An Analysis of British Companies using Voting Power Indices," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 529.

1998

• Antonio Romero-Medina, 1998, "Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 2, pages 137-147.
• Luis Ruiz & Federico Valenciano & José Zarzuelo, 1998, "Some new results on least square values for TU games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, volume 6, issue 1, pages 139-158, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF02564802.
• Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, J., 1998, "Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-33.
• Slikker, M., 1998, "A Note on Link Formation," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-20.
• Timmer, J.B. & Borm, P.E.M. & Suijs, J.P.M., 1998, "Linear Transformation of Products : Games and Economies," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-76.
• Koster, M.A.L. & Molina, E. & Sprumont, Y. & Tijs, S.H., 1998, "Core Representations of the Standard Fixed Tree Game," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-21.
• Slikker, M., 1998, "Average Convexity in Communication Situations," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-12.
• Voorneveld, M. & van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M., 1998, "Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria : An Investigation of Core Concepts," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-62.
• Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 1998, "A note on games corresponding to sequencing situations with due dates," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-46.
• Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Suijs, J.P.M., 1998, "On the Balancedness of M-Sequencing Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-17.
• Timmer, J.B. & Borm, P.E.M. & Suijs, J.P.M., 1998, "Linear Transformation of Products : Games and Economies," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 39313f90-919c-419d-8e10-c.
• van der Laan, G. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 1998, "Cooperative games in permutational structure," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 94dd61cf-8471-40af-8cc8-4.
• John P. Conley & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1998, "Taste-homogeneity of Optimal Jurisdictions in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number mwooders-98-01, Jul.
• Rudolf KERSCHBAMER & Nina MADERNER, 1998, "Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics, number vie9805, Oct.
• George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1998, "Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, number imp-mon, Jul.
• Guillaume Haeringer, 1998, "A new weight scheme for the Shapley value," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9807001, Jul.
• Leech, D., 1998, "Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games: A New Algorithm," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 510.
• Sander, Birgit, 1998, "Strategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetz," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 901.
• Demopoulos, G.D. & Yannacopoulos, N.A., 1998, "Conditions for an Optimality of an Optimum Currency Area," DEOS Working Papers, Athens University of Economics and Business, number 0098-02.
• Raith, Matthias G., 2017, "Fair negotiation procedures," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, number 300, Apr.
• Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998, "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 98-1, revised Jan 1998.
• Sylvie Thoron, 1998, "Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 1, pages 63-76, February.
• John P. Conley & Myrna Wooders, 1998, "Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 4, pages 952-974, November.
• Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998, "Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1998001, Jan.
• Dubra, J.M., 1998, "An Asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 98-09.
• Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998, "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 58, issue 1, pages 43-49, January.
• Blume, Andreas, 1998, "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 2, pages 171-202, February.
• Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S., 1998, "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 25, issue 2, pages 272-291, November.
• Ok, Efe A., 1998, "Inequality averse collective choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 30, issue 3, pages 301-321, October.
• Nehring, Klaus, 1998, "Incentive-compatibility in large games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 35, issue 1, pages 57-67, January.
• Hamiache, G., 1998, "The Owen Value Values Friendship," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 98a16.
• Demopoulos, G.D. & Yannacopoulos, N.A., 1998, "Conditions for an Optimality of an Optimum Currency Area," Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies, number 91.
• Mailath, G.J. & Morris, S., 1998, "Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 349.
• Sandsmark, M., 1998, "Production Games, Core Solutions, and Uncertainty," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 0398.
• Grabisch, M. & Roubens, M., 1998, "An Axiomatic Approach to the Concept of Interaction Among Players in Cooperative Games," Liege - Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie, UNIVERSITE DE LIEGE, Faculte d'economie, de gestion et de sciences sociales, Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie, number 9818.
• Moulin, Y. & Muller, R., 1998, "nnaire. Contribution a une anthropologie de la cooperation," Papers, Groupe de recherche en économie financière et en gestion des entreprises, Universite Nancy 2, number 1998-13.
• Kerschbamer, R. & Maderner, N., 1998, "Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information," Papers, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy, number 9805.
• Chakrabarti, R., 1998, "Models of Remittances and Migration With or Without Cooperation," Papers, Wellesley College - Department of Economics, number 98-05.
• Segendorff, Björn, 1998, "Delegation of Bargaining and Power," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 248, Aug.
• Marco Mariotti, 1998, "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, number 98/16, Feb, revised Feb 1998.
• Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco, 1998, "The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders," ISU General Staff Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 199805010700001042, May.
• Nejat Anbarci & Gyoseob Yi, 1998, "An iterative allocation mechanism in the edgeworth box," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, volume 4, issue 3, pages 253-258, August, DOI: 10.1007/BF02294894.
• Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998, "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, volume 94, issue 3-4, pages 317-339, March.
• Annick Laruelle & Mika Widgrén, 1998, "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Public Choice, Springer, volume 94, issue 3, pages 317-339, March, DOI: 10.1023/A:1004965310450.
• Tone Dieckmann; & Ulrich Schwalbe, 1998, "Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core," Economics Department Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth, number n810798, Jul.
• Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998, "Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan, number 006.
• Oscar Volij, 1998, "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij, number 006, Sep, revised 15 Sep 1999.
• Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco, 1998, "The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 22139, May.
• F. Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz & Carles Rafels, 1998, "On the intersection between the imputation setand the Weber set," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 84, issue 0, pages 111-120, December, DOI: 10.1023/A:1018928618125.
• Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels, 1998, "On extreme points of the core and reduced games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 84, issue 0, pages 121-133, December, DOI: 10.1023/A:1018980602195.
• Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang & Dolf Talman, 1998, "Cooperative games in permutational structure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 427-442.

1997

• Andreoni, J. & Brown, P.M. & Vesterlund, L., 1997, "Fairness, Selfishness and Selfish Fairness: Experiments on Games with Unequal Equilibrium," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9726.
• Rajiv Vohra, 1997, "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 97-11.
• Laruelle, Annick & Widgrén, Mika, 1997, "The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 1600, Mar.
• Laruelle, Annick, 1997, "Implementing democracy in indirect voting processes: the Knesset case," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1997013, Aug.
• Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 1997, "The Nucleolus is Contested-Garment-Consistent: A Direct Proof," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 97-12.
• Serrano, Roberto, 1997, "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 55, issue 2, pages 203-208, August.
• Hamiache, G., 1997, "New Axiomatizations of the Owen Value for Games with Coalition Structures," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a03.
• Hamiache, G., 1997, "A Value with Incomplete Communication," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a22.
• Hamiache, G., 1997, "On the Concept of Middleman when Communication is Graph-Restricted," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a31.
• Koray, S. & Sertel, M., 1997, "A Multiplication of Solution Concepts," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 162.
• Arin, J. & Inarra, E., 1997, "Consistency and Egalitarianism: The Egalitarian Set," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 163.
• Hamiache, G., 1997, "A Value with Incomplete Communication," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 169.
• María Gallastegui & Fritz Grafe & Elena Inarra, 1997, "Congestion effects in a public-good economy," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 66, issue 2, pages 189-204, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF01234406.
• Georg Kirchsteiger & Clemens Puppe, 1997, "On the Formation of Political Coalitions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 153, issue 2, pages 293-293, June.
• Sherstyuk, K., 1997, "Multisided Matching Games," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 544.
• Sherstyuk, K, 1997, "Team Selection with Asymmetric Agents," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 572.
• Darin Lee & Oscar Volij, 1997, "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij, number 005, Nov.
• Graciela Chichilnisky, 1997, "A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium, the Core and Social Choice," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 6, in: Kenneth J. Arrow & Amartya Sen & Kotaro Suzumura, "Social Choice Re-examined", DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_10.
• Armstrong, J. Scott, 1997, "Review of Co-opetition by Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 81675, Apr.
• P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1997, "An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S Theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 361-367.
• Benyamin Shitovitz, 1997, "A comparison between the core and the monopoly solutions in a mixed exchange economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 3, pages 559-563.
• Jingang Zhao, 1997, "A Cooperative Analysis of Covert Collusion in Oligopolistic Industries," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 26, issue 2, pages 249-266.
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