IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ratio equilibria and voting in a public goods economy with jurisdictions


  • CURRARINI , Sergio

    (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)


1n two related papers, Kaneko (1977, 1977a) hILS proved an equivalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a specific public good. First, for economies in which a central authority exists, we provide sufficient conditions on the voting rules and on the institutional set-up for Kaneko's equivalence result to generalize. Next, for economies with independent jurisdictions, we propose a conceptof (noncooperative) equilbrium and prove the nonemptiness of the set of equilibrium allocations under the assumption that each public good is non inferior in the jurisdiction producing it. For this case, we also study a oooperation process among independent jurisdictions.

Suggested Citation

  • CURRARINI , Sergio, 1996. "Ratio equilibria and voting in a public goods economy with jurisdictions," CORE Discussion Papers 1996064, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1996064

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Ratio Equilibrium; Voting; Core; Public Goods; Jurisdictions;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1996064. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.