Ratio equilibria and voting in a public goods economy with jurisdictions
1n two related papers, Kaneko (1977, 1977a) hILS proved an equivalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a specific public good. First, for economies in which a central authority exists, we provide sufficient conditions on the voting rules and on the institutional set-up for Kaneko's equivalence result to generalize. Next, for economies with independent jurisdictions, we propose a conceptof (noncooperative) equilbrium and prove the nonemptiness of the set of equilibrium allocations under the assumption that each public good is non inferior in the jurisdiction producing it. For this case, we also study a oooperation process among independent jurisdictions.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 1996|
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