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A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium, the Core and Social Choice

In: Social Choice Re-examined

Author

Listed:
  • Graciela Chichilnisky

    (Columbia University
    UNESCO)

Abstract

Social diversity is central to resource allocation. People trade because they are different. Gains from trade and the scope for mutually advantageous reallocation depend on the diversity of the traders’ preferences and endowments. The market owes its existence to the diversity of those who make up the economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Graciela Chichilnisky, 1997. "A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium, the Core and Social Choice," International Economic Association Series, in: Kenneth J. Arrow & Amartya Sen & Kotaro Suzumura (ed.), Social Choice Re-examined, chapter 6, pages 121-174, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25849-9_10
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_10
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1997. "A topological invariant for competitive markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 445-469, November.
    2. Lauwers, Luc, 2000. "Topological social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-39, July.
    3. Graciela Chichilnisky, 1998. "The knowledge revolution," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 39-54.
    4. Graciela Chichilnisky, 1996. "Markets And Games: A Simple Equivalence Among The Core, Equilibrium And Limited Arbitrage," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 266-280, October.
    5. Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2005. "Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 22-44, September.
    6. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1997. "Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 470-479, November.
    7. Graciela Chichilnisky, 1996. "A robust theory of resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, January.
    8. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1996. "Markets with endogenous uncertainty: theory and policy," MPRA Paper 8612, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page, Frank Jr. & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1997. "Arbitrage, equilibrium, and gains from trade: A counterexample," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 481-501, November.
    10. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1996. "Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the non-emptiness of the core," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 177-180, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Choice; Competitive Equilibrium; Pareto Frontier; Social Diversity; Unify Perspective;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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