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A Cooperative Analysis of Covert Collusion in Oligopolistic Industries

Author

Listed:
  • Jingang Zhao

    (Department of Economics, Ohio State University, 1945 North High Street, Columbus, OH 43210-1172, USA)

Abstract

This paper provides existence results for a large class of covertly collusive outcomes in oligopoly markets. In particular, the paper shows that the Alpha-core is non-empty in linear industries with any asymmetric costs and any asymmetric capacity bounds (JEL C62, C71, D43, L13).

Suggested Citation

  • Jingang Zhao, 1997. "A Cooperative Analysis of Covert Collusion in Oligopolistic Industries," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(2), pages 249-266.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:249-266
    Note: Received March 1995 Revised version August 1995
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2015. "Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(3), pages 253-287, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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