A generalization of the bankruptcy game: financial cooperative games
A new class of games called Financial games is defined. These games are market games and it is showed that they are a generalization of Bankruptcy games. The algebraic structure of this class of games is studied and necessary conditions for a game to be financial are stated. The proportional solution is analyzed and an axiomatic characterization of this solution is given.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
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