A Value with Incomplete Communication
The aim of this paper is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game is defined and the value has to verify a consistency axiom. The generalization proposed here is different from the Myerson value, and it coincides with Shapley value in the case of full communication.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
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