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Juan Matias Ortner

Personal Details

First Name:Juan
Middle Name:Matias
Last Name:Ortner
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:por114
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://people.bu.edu/jortner/
Terminal Degree:2012 Department of Economics; Princeton University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Boston University

Boston, Massachusetts (United States)
http://www.bu.edu/econ/

: 617-353-4389
617-353-4449
270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215
RePEc:edi:decbuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner, 2019. "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," NBER Working Papers 25654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Juan M. Ortner & Martin C. Schmalz, 2018. "Disagreement and Optimal Security Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 6906, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Ortner, Juan & Schmalz, Martin, 2018. "Disagreement and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 12596, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Policy Reform," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  5. Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Working Papers 072_2015, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  6. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  7. Juan Ortner, 2014. "Political Bargaining in a Changing World," 2014 Meeting Papers 445, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Juan M. Ortner, 2010. "Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals," Working Papers 1289, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  9. Avidit Acharya & Juan Matias Ortner, 2010. "Delays and Partial Agreements in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 1263, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..

Articles

  1. Ortner, Juan, 2019. "A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 720-733.
  2. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2018. "Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion, and Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 2108-2133.
  3. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
  4. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Progressive Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1965-1990, November.
  5. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
  6. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
  7. Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 352-366.
  8. Acharya, Avidit & Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2150-2163.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner, 2019. "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," NBER Working Papers 25654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. de Leverano, Adriano, 2019. "Collusion through market sharing agreements: Evidence from Quebec's road paving market," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-053, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

  2. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Policy Reform," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Philip Grech & Oriol Tejada, 2018. "Divide the dollar and conquer more: sequential bargaining and risk aversion," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1261-1286, November.

  3. Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Working Papers 072_2015, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..

    Cited by:

    1. De Rassenfosse, Gaétan & Decarolis, Francesco & Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria & Iossa, Elisabetta & Mollisi, Vincenzo & Raiteri, Emilio & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2019. "Buyers' Role in Innovation Procurement," CEPR Discussion Papers 13777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Working Papers 1088, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Francesco Decarolis & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Riccardo Pacini, 2016. "Past Performance and Procurement Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 22814, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner, 2019. "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," NBER Working Papers 25654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Waterson, Michael & Xie, Jian, 2019. "Testing for collusion in bus contracting in London," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1196, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    6. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, "undated". "Demand-Driven Integration and Divorcement Policy," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-276, Boston University - Department of Economics.

  4. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..

    Cited by:

    1. Pollrich, Martin & von Negenborn, Colin, 2018. "Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 100, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    2. Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah, 2017. "‘Strong Personalities’ and ‘Strong Institutions’ Mediated by a ‘Strong Third Force’: Thinking ‘Systems’ in Corruption Control," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 545-562, December.

  5. Juan Ortner, 2014. "Political Bargaining in a Changing World," 2014 Meeting Papers 445, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Alp Simsek & Muhamet Yildiz, 2016. "Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  6. Juan M. Ortner, 2010. "Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals," Working Papers 1289, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..

    Cited by:

    1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018. "Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 682, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1099, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    4. LOMBARDI, Michele & YOSHIHARA, Naoki, 2017. "Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-47, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2016. "Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 21-23.
    6. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2015. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences," Working Papers halshs-01226803, HAL.
    7. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.
    8. Barron, Kai & Nurminen, Tuomas, 2018. "Nudging cooperation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2018-305, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    9. Peralta, Esteban, 2019. "Bayesian implementation with verifiable information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-72.
    10. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CARF F-Series CARF-F-447, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    11. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
    12. George F. N. Shoukry, 2019. "Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 497-526, March.
    13. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve, 2017. "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 613-631.
    14. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Treading a Â…fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Working Papers SDES-2017-14, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
    15. Doğan, Battal, 2017. "Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 103-110.
    16. Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 241-251.
    17. Savva, Foivos, 2018. "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 27-34.

  7. Avidit Acharya & Juan Matias Ortner, 2010. "Delays and Partial Agreements in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 1263, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..

    Cited by:

    1. Bond, Eric W. & Samuelson, Larry, 2019. "Bargaining with private information and the option of a compulsory license," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 83-100.
    2. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    3. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Policy Reform," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2018. "Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion, and Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 2108-2133.

    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Working Papers 1088, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Perez-Richet, Eduardo & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2017. "Information Design under Falsification," CEPR Discussion Papers 12271, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Test Design Under Falsification," Sciences Po publications 2018-13, Sciences Po.

  2. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly," Discussion Paper 2019-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    2. Nava, Francesco & Schiraldi, Pasquale, 2019. "Differentiated durable goods monopoly: a robust Coase conjecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90512, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
    4. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2015. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    5. Antoniou, Fabio & Fiocco, Raffaele, 2020. "Storable good market with intertemporal cost variations," MPRA Paper 97948, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Ortner, Juan, 2019. "A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 720-733.

  3. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Policy Reform," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    2. Austen-Smith, David & Dziuda, Wioletta & Harstad, Bård & Loeper, Antoine, 2019. "Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4).
    3. Fanning, Jack, 2018. "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 518-555.
    4. Ortner, Juan, 2019. "A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 720-733.
    5. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

  4. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 352-366.

    Cited by:

    1. Alp Simsek & Muhamet Yildiz, 2016. "Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

  6. Acharya, Avidit & Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2150-2163.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2014-11-17 2018-03-05 2018-03-26
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2017-04-16 2019-04-01
  3. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2019-03-25 2019-04-01
  4. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2014-11-17
  5. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2018-03-05
  6. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2019-03-25
  7. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2017-04-16
  8. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2014-11-17

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