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Juan Matias Ortner

Personal Details

First Name:Juan
Middle Name:Matias
Last Name:Ortner
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:por114
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://people.bu.edu/jortner/
Terminal Degree:2012 Department of Economics; Princeton University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Boston University

Boston, Massachusetts (United States)
http://www.bu.edu/econ/
RePEc:edi:decbuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2022. "Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," NBER Working Papers 29625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Juan M. Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi, 2022. "Screening Adaptive Cartels," NBER Working Papers 30219, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner, 2021. "The Value of Privacy in Cartels: An Analysis of the Inner Workings of a Bidding Ring," NBER Working Papers 28539, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner, 2019. "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," NBER Working Papers 25654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Juan M. Ortner & Martin C. Schmalz, 2018. "Disagreement and Optimal Security Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 6906, CESifo.
  6. Schmalz, Martin & Ortner, Juan, 2018. "Disagreement and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 12596, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Policy Reform," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  8. Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Working Papers 072_2015, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  9. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  10. Juan Ortner, 2014. "Political Bargaining in a Changing World," 2014 Meeting Papers 445, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Juan M. Ortner, 2010. "Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals," Working Papers 1289, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  12. Avidit Acharya & Juan Matias Ortner, 2010. "Delays and Partial Agreements in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 1263, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..

    repec:pri:econom:2020-59 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan Ortner, 2022. "Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 315-346, January.
  2. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2022. "Paths to the Frontier," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 39-69, February.
  3. Ortner, Juan, 2019. "A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 720-733.
  4. Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2019. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(5), pages 2269-2300.
  5. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2018. "Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion, and Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 2108-2133.
  6. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
  7. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Progressive Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1965-1990, November.
  8. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
  9. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
  10. Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 352-366.
  11. Acharya, Avidit & Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2150-2163.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2022. "Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," NBER Working Papers 29625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Aljoscha Janssen, 2022. "Price dynamics of Swedish pharmaceuticals," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 313-351, December.
    2. Panhans, Matthew T., 2023. "The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm," SocArXiv dvm3e, Center for Open Science.
    3. Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti & Leonardo Maria Giuffrida, 2022. "Procuring Survival," CESifo Working Paper Series 10124, CESifo.
    4. Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas, 2023. "Calculating the probability of collusion based on observed price patterns," Umeå Economic Studies 1014, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 13 Oct 2023.
    5. Lu, Jiaxuan, 2023. "The economics of China’s between-city height competition: A regression discontinuity approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).

  2. Juan M. Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi, 2022. "Screening Adaptive Cartels," NBER Working Papers 30219, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Adriano De Leverano, 2020. "Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation," Working Paper 1446, Economics Department, Queen's University.

  3. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner, 2019. "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," NBER Working Papers 25654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Kory Kroft & Yao Luo & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2020. "Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry," NBER Working Papers 27325, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Hannes Wallimann & David Imhof & Martin Huber, 2020. "A Machine Learning Approach for Flagging Incomplete Bid-rigging Cartels," Papers 2004.05629, arXiv.org.
    3. de Leverano, Adriano, 2019. "Collusion through market sharing agreements: Evidence from Quebec's road paving market," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-053, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. Francesco Decarolis & Cristina Giorgiantonio, 2020. "Corruption red flags in public procurement: new evidence from Italian calls for tenders," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 544, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Huang, Yangguang, 2019. "An empirical study of scoring auctions and quality manipulation corruption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    6. Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Adriano De Leverano, 2020. "Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation," Working Paper 1446, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    7. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan Ortner, 2022. "Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 315-346, January.
    8. David Imhof & Hannes Wallimann, 2021. "Detecting bid-rigging coalitions in different countries and auction formats," Papers 2105.00337, arXiv.org.
    9. Silveira, Douglas & de Moraes, Lucas B. & Fiuza, Eduardo P.S. & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2023. "Who are you? Cartel detection using unlabeled data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).

  4. Juan M. Ortner & Martin C. Schmalz, 2018. "Disagreement and Optimal Security Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 6906, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Huang, Sheng & Maharjan, Johan & Thakor, Anjan V., 2020. "Disagreement-induced CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).

  5. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Policy Reform," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. Philip Grech & Oriol Tejada, 2018. "Divide the dollar and conquer more: sequential bargaining and risk aversion," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1261-1286, November.
    3. Hülya Eraslan & Kirill S. Evdokimov & Jan Zápal, 2022. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Emin Karagözoğlu & Kyle B. Hyndman (ed.), Bargaining, chapter 0, pages 151-175, Springer.

  6. Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Working Papers 072_2015, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..

    Cited by:

    1. David Barrus & Frank Scott, 2020. "Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 483-522, September.
    2. Iossa, Elisabetta & Decarolis, Francesco & de Rassenfosse, Gaétan & Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria & Mollisi, Vincenzo & Raiteri, Emilio & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2019. "Buyers' Role in Innovation Procurement," CEPR Discussion Papers 13777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Estache, Antonio & Foucart, Renaud & Serebrisky, Tomás, 2022. "When can lotteries improve public procurement processes?," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12484, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. David P. Brown & Andrew Eckert, 2022. "Pricing Patterns in Wholesale Electricity Markets: Unilateral Market Power or Coordinated Behavior?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 168-216, March.
    5. de Leverano, Adriano, 2019. "Collusion through market sharing agreements: Evidence from Quebec's road paving market," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-053, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Working Papers 1088, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Rey, Patrick & Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie, 2023. "Coordination in the Fight Against Collusion," TSE Working Papers 23-1441, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    8. Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2022. "Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," NBER Working Papers 29625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Adriano De Leverano, 2020. "Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation," Working Paper 1446, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    10. Laura Boudreau & Sylvain Chassang & Ada González-Torre & Rachel Heath, 2023. "Monitoring Harassment in Organizations," Working Papers 2022-19, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    11. Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas, 2023. "Calculating the probability of collusion based on observed price patterns," Umeå Economic Studies 1014, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 13 Oct 2023.
    12. Francesco Decarolis & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Riccardo Pacini, 2016. "Past Performance and Procurement Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 22814, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. John Asker & Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee, 2021. "Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods," NBER Working Papers 28602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. John Asker & Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee, 2021. "Patent auctions and bidding coalitions: structuring the sale of club goods," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(3), pages 662-690, September.
    15. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan Ortner, 2022. "Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 315-346, January.
    16. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner, 2019. "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," NBER Working Papers 25654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Avidit Acharya & Robin Harding & J. Andrew Harris, 2020. "Security in the absence of a state: Traditional authority, livestock trading, and maritime piracy in northern Somalia," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 497-537, October.
    18. Mark J. Garmaise & Gabriel Natividad, 2024. "Fiscal windfalls and entrepreneurship: fostering entry or promoting incumbents?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 133-158, January.
    19. Juan M. Ortner & Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi, 2022. "Screening Adaptive Cartels," NBER Working Papers 30219, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Ricard Gil & Giorgio Zanarone, 2018. "On the determinants and consequences of informal contracting," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 726-741, October.
    21. Gabrielli, M. Florencia & Willington, Manuel, 2023. "Estimating damages from bidding rings in first-price auctions," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    22. Waterson, Michael & Xie, Jian, 2019. "Testing for collusion in bus contracting in London," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1196, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    23. Francesco Decarolis & Leonardo M Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2020. "Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes [“Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 537-597.
    24. Hatsumi, Kentaro & Ishii, Rieko, 2022. "The effect of price on the quality of public construction in Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    25. Bruno Baranek & L. Musolff & Vitezslav Titl, 2021. "Detection of Collusive Networks in E-procurement," Working Papers 2111, Utrecht School of Economics.
    26. Zhang, Wenzhang, 2022. "Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    27. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, "undated". "Demand-Driven Integration and Divorcement Policy," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-276, Boston University - Department of Economics.

  7. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..

    Cited by:

    1. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    2. Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah, 2017. "‘Strong Personalities’ and ‘Strong Institutions’ Mediated by a ‘Strong Third Force’: Thinking ‘Systems’ in Corruption Control," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 545-562, December.

  8. Juan Ortner, 2014. "Political Bargaining in a Changing World," 2014 Meeting Papers 445, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Alp Simsek & Muhamet Yildiz, 2016. "Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  9. Juan M. Ortner, 2010. "Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals," Working Papers 1289, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..

    Cited by:

    1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018. "Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 682, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1099, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    4. LOMBARDI, Michele & YOSHIHARA, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2017. "Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-47, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2016. "Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 21-23.
    6. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2015. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences," Working Papers halshs-01226803, HAL.
    7. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.
    8. Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & Carlos Pimienta, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," Post-Print halshs-01630037, HAL.
    9. Barron, Kai & Nurminen, Tuomas, 2018. "Nudging cooperation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2018-305, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    10. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Implementation, Honesty, and Common Knowledge," CARF F-Series CARF-F-500, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    11. Peralta, Esteban, 2019. "Bayesian implementation with verifiable information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-72.
    12. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CARF F-Series CARF-F-447, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    13. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-518, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    14. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2022. "Honesty and Epistemological Implementation of Social Choice Functions with Asymmetric Information," CARF F-Series CARF-F-549, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    15. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
    16. George F. N. Shoukry, 2019. "Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 497-526, March.
    17. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve, 2017. "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 613-631.
    18. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Treading a Â…fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Working Papers SDES-2017-14, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
    19. Doğan, Battal, 2017. "Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 103-110.
    20. Savva, Foivos, 2018. "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 27-34.
    21. Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
    22. Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

  10. Avidit Acharya & Juan Matias Ortner, 2010. "Delays and Partial Agreements in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 1263, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..

    Cited by:

    1. Bond, Eric W. & Samuelson, Larry, 2019. "Bargaining with private information and the option of a compulsory license," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 83-100.
    2. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    3. Francesca Flamini, 2020. "Divide and Invest: Bargaining in a Dynamic Framework," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 121-153, November.
    4. Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago, 2023. "Collective hold-up," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    5. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Policy Reform," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan Ortner, 2022. "Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 315-346, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Aljoscha Janssen, 2022. "Price dynamics of Swedish pharmaceuticals," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 313-351, December.
    2. Rohit Lamba & Sergey Zhuk, 2022. "Pricing with algorithms," Papers 2205.04661, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    3. Hannes Wallimann & David Imhof & Martin Huber, 2023. "A Machine Learning Approach for Flagging Incomplete Bid-Rigging Cartels," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 62(4), pages 1669-1720, December.
    4. Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti & Leonardo Maria Giuffrida, 2022. "Procuring Survival," CESifo Working Paper Series 10124, CESifo.
    5. Hannes Wallimann & Silvio Sticher, 2023. "On suspicious tracks: machine-learning based approaches to detect cartels in railway-infrastructure procurement," Papers 2304.11888, arXiv.org.
    6. Narita, Yusuke & Yata, Kohei, 2022. "Algorithm is Experiment: Machine Learning, Market Design, and Policy Eligibility Rules," CEI Working Paper Series 2021-05, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    7. Lu, Jiaxuan, 2023. "The economics of China’s between-city height competition: A regression discontinuity approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    8. Narita, Yusuke & Yata, Kohei, 2022. "Algorithm is Experiment: Machine Learning, Market Design, and Policy Eligibility Rules," Discussion Paper Series 730, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

  2. Ortner, Juan, 2019. "A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 720-733.

    Cited by:

    1. Bowen, T. Renee & Krasa, Stefan & Hwang, Ilwoo, 2020. "Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining," CEPR Discussion Papers 15406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Renee Bowen & Ilwoo Hwang & Stefan Krasa, 2020. "Personal Power Dynamics in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 27981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  3. Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2019. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(5), pages 2269-2300.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2018. "Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion, and Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 2108-2133.

    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Decarolis & Raymond Fisman & Paolo Pinotti & Silvia Vannutelli, 2019. "Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-344, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    2. Hsien-Yi Chen & Sheng-Syan Chen, 2023. "Can credit default swaps exert an enduring monitoring influence on political integrity?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 445-469, February.
    3. Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/417, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Test Design Under Falsification," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393136, HAL.
    5. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco Alexander Schwarz, 2021. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," CESifo Working Paper Series 8968, CESifo.
    6. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Discussion Papers 2020/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    7. Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Working Papers 1088, Barcelona School of Economics.
    8. Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2019. "Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers 2019-22, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    9. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
    10. Chiu Yu Ko & Bo Shen & Xuyao Zhang, 2023. "Can corruption encourage clean technology transfer?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 459-492, June.
    11. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    12. Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    13. Skreta, Vasiliki & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2017. "Information Design under Falsification," CEPR Discussion Papers 12271, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Daniele Condorelli & Massimiliano Furlan, 2023. "Cheap Talking Algorithms," Papers 2310.07867, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    15. Tan, Teck Yong, 2023. "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    16. Mookherjee, Dilip & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2023. "Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    17. Mookherjee, Dilip & Motta, Alberto & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2020. "Consulting collusive experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 290-317.
    18. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    19. S. Nageeb Ali & Nima Haghpanah & Xiao Lin & Ron Siegel, 2020. "How to Sell Hard Information," Papers 2010.08037, arXiv.org.
    20. Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2019. "Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments," NBER Working Papers 25918, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  5. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly," Discussion Paper 2019-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    2. Francesc Dilmé, 2021. "The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 063, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    3. Nava, Francesco & Schiraldi, Pasquale, 2019. "Differentiated durable goods monopoly: a robust Coase conjecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90512, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel Garrett, 2022. "A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 191, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    5. Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri & Ignacio Monzón, 2022. "Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1591-1620, May.
    6. Francesc Dilmé, 2022. "Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 193, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    7. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    8. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2015. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    9. Ortner, Juan, 2023. "Bargaining with evolving private information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    10. Brzustowski, Thomas & Georgiadis Harris, Alkis & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Smart contracts and the Coase conjecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 117950, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Yonatan Gur & Gregory Macnamara & Daniela Saban, 2022. "Sequential Procurement with Contractual and Experimental Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2714-2731, April.
    12. Antoniou, Fabio & Fiocco, Raffaele, 2020. "Storable good market with intertemporal cost variations," MPRA Paper 97948, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Ortner, Juan, 2019. "A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 720-733.

  6. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Progressive Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1965-1990, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    2. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022. "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    3. Johannes Abeler & David Huffman & Colin Raymond, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," Economics Series Working Papers 1012, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Brzustowski, Thomas & Georgiadis Harris, Alkis & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Smart contracts and the Coase conjecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 117950, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Abeler, Johannes & Huffman, David B. & Raymond, Collin, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 16284, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Yonatan Gur & Gregory Macnamara & Daniela Saban, 2022. "Sequential Procurement with Contractual and Experimental Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2714-2731, April.

  7. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Gerardi, Dino & Grillo, Edoardo & Monzón, Ignacio, 2022. "The perils of friendly oversight," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. Bård Harstad, 2018. "Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series 7296, CESifo.
    3. Harstad, Bård, 2021. "A Theory of Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," Memorandum 5/2022, Oslo University, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2021.
    4. Helios Herrera & Antonin Macé & Matias Nùnez, 2023. "Political Brinkmanship and Compromise," PSE Working Papers halshs-03225030, HAL.
    5. Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Policy Reform," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    6. Austen-Smith, David & Dziuda, Wioletta & Harstad, Bård & Loeper, Antoine, 2019. "Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    7. Fanning, Jack, 2018. "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 518-555.
    8. Ortner, Juan, 2019. "A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 720-733.
    9. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

  8. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 352-366.

    Cited by:

    1. Alp Simsek & Muhamet Yildiz, 2016. "Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

  10. Acharya, Avidit & Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2150-2163.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 11 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (7) 2017-04-16 2019-04-01 2021-03-15 2022-02-07 2022-03-07 2022-03-21 2022-08-15. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (6) 2019-03-25 2019-04-01 2021-03-15 2022-02-07 2022-03-21 2022-08-15. Author is listed
  3. NEP-REG: Regulation (4) 2022-02-07 2022-03-07 2022-03-21 2022-08-15
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2014-11-17 2018-03-05 2018-03-26
  5. NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2022-03-21
  6. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2014-11-17
  7. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2018-03-05
  8. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2022-02-07
  9. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2019-03-25
  10. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2017-04-16
  11. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2014-11-17

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