IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmic/v14y2022i1p39-69.html

Paths to the Frontier

Author

Listed:
  • Avidit Acharya
  • Juan Ortner

Abstract

We construct a model of collective search in which players gradually approach the Pareto frontier. The players have imperfect control over which improvements to the status quo will be considered. Inefficiency takes place due to the difficulty in finding improvements acceptable to both parties. The process is path dependent, with early agreements determining long-run outcomes. It may also be cyclical, as players alternate between being more and less accommodating.

Suggested Citation

  • Avidit Acharya & Juan Ortner, 2022. "Paths to the Frontier," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 39-69, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:1:p:39-69
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190125
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20190125
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20190125.appx
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20190125.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/mic.20190125?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Helios Herrera & Antonin Macé & Matías Núñez, 2025. "Political Brinkmanship And Compromise," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 66(3), pages 1317-1339, August.
    2. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Chaturvedi, Rakesh, 2024. "Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 105-120.
    3. Roland Kirstein, 2024. "Strategic delegation in Nash bargaining," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 45(2), pages 784-794, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:1:p:39-69. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.