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Report NEP-DES-2019-04-01
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan Ortner, 2019, "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, Boston University - Department of Economics, number WP2019-04, Mar.
- Cary Deck & Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker, 2019, "Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best?," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 19-06.
- Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie) & Ong, David & Segev, Ella, 2017, "Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 70793, Jun.