Group Contracting and Enforcement
We consider a principal-multiagent framework with adverse selection when contracting is possible ex ante. However, enforcement of contracts is imperfect, which results in inefficiencies. We study how group contracting may or may not mitigate those inefficiencies.
Volume (Year): 157 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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