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Etude des facteurs contingents du taux de remboursement au sein d'une institution de microfinance: le cas du Togo

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  • Marek Hudon
  • Tchakodo Ouro-Koura

Abstract

Among the contingent factors of the repayment rate of the microcredits, the joint responsibility of the borrowers is little analyzed in the empirical studies. Thanks to an original database, this article estimates the impact of the contingent factors of the repayment rate, particularly the loan methodology. The results show that, on one hand, in the category of the loans repaid without delay, the individual loans offer a better repayment rate but also, on the other hand, that this effect becomes blurred when the late repayments are incorporated. Among other contingent factors of the repayment rate, we count mainly the distance between the place of residence of the customers and the institution and the purpose of the loan. © 2008 The Authors Journal compilation © CIRIEC 2008.

Suggested Citation

  • Marek Hudon & Tchakodo Ouro-Koura, 2008. "Etude des facteurs contingents du taux de remboursement au sein d'une institution de microfinance: le cas du Togo," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/14214, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/14214
    Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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    Cited by:

    1. Bénédique Paul, 2014. "Why Should Microfinance Organizations Invest In Clients Business Training? Empirical Results from the Haitian Microfinance Industry," International Journal of Management Sciences, Research Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 2(4), pages 191-202.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • Q14 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Finance

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