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Do Peer Group Members Outperform Individual Borrowers? A Test of Peer Group Lending Using Canadian Micro-Credit Data

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  • Rafael Gomez
  • Eric Santor

Abstract

Microfinance institutions now serve over 10 million poor households in the developing and developed world, and much of their success has been attributed to their innovative use of peer group lending. There is very little empirical evidence, however, to suggest that group lending schemes offer a superior institutional design over lending programs that serve individual borrowers. The authors find empirical evidence that group lending does indeed lower borrower default rates more than conventional individual lending, and that this effect operates through the dual channels of selection into the peer lending program and, once inside the program, greater group borrower effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Rafael Gomez & Eric Santor, 2003. "Do Peer Group Members Outperform Individual Borrowers? A Test of Peer Group Lending Using Canadian Micro-Credit Data," Staff Working Papers 03-33, Bank of Canada.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:03-33
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Klein, Thilo, 2017. "Intermediation in peer-to-peer markets: Evidence from auctions for personal loans," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-073, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    2. Kono, Hisaki, 2006. "Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam," IDE Discussion Papers 61, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
    3. Kurosaki, Takashi & Khan, Hidayat Ullah, 2011. "Vulnerability of Microfinance to Strategic Default and Covariate Shocks:Evidence from Pakistan," PRIMCED Discussion Paper Series 10, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 167-180.
    5. ZOUARI, Zeineb & NABI, Mahmoud Sami, 2015. "Enhancing The Enforceability Of Islamic Microfinance Contracts In Oic Countries," Policy Papers 1435-2, The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute (IRTI).
    6. McIntosh, Craig & Villaran, Gonzalo & Wydick, Bruce, 2011. "Microfinance and Home Improvement: Using Retrospective Panel Data to Measure Program Effects on Fundamental Events," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 922-937, June.
    7. Unger, Jens M. & Rauch, Andreas & Frese, Michael & Rosenbusch, Nina, 2011. "Human capital and entrepreneurial success: A meta-analytical review," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 341-358, May.
    8. Seth Freedman & Ginger Zhe Jin, 2014. "The Information Value of Online Social Networks: Lessons from Peer-to-Peer Lending," NBER Working Papers 19820, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. ZOUARI, Zeineb & NABI, Mahmoud Sami, 2013. "Enhancing the Enforceability of Islamic Microfinance Contracts in OIC countries," MPRA Paper 49816, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Griffin, Denis & Husted, Bryan W., 2015. "Social sanctions or social relations? Microfinance in Mexico," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(12), pages 2579-2587.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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