Enhancing the Enforceability of Islamic Microfinance Contracts in OIC countries
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- ZOUARI, Zeineb & NABI, Mahmoud Sami, 2015. "Enhancing The Enforceability Of Islamic Microfinance Contracts In Oic Countries," Policy Papers 1435-2, The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute (IRTI).
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsIslamic microfinance; information asymmetry; monitoring costs; regulation and supervision.;
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
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