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Interest Rates In Group Lending: A Behavioural Investigation

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  • Klaus Abbink
  • Bernd Irlenbusch
  • Elke Renner

Abstract

. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) serve more than 5 million households in developing countries. A crucial variable for MFI schemes is the interest rate to be charged from borrowers. This paper studies the behavioural impacts of the repayment burden on repayment performance. In a laboratory experiment, we vary the amount a borrower group has to repay and study how this affects free‐riding behaviour. We can identify two counteracting effects: a higher repayment burden intensifies the incentives to free‐ride as shirking saves more money. On the other hand, high‐interest loans are less tolerant towards defaulters, which exerts a disciplining effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2006. "Interest Rates In Group Lending: A Behavioural Investigation," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 185-199, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:11:y:2006:i:2:p:185-199
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2006.00309.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2006. "Group Size and Social Ties in Microfinance Institutions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(4), pages 614-628, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. ZOUARI, Zeineb & NABI, Mahmoud Sami, 2013. "Enhancing the Enforceability of Islamic Microfinance Contracts in OIC countries," MPRA Paper 49816, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Leonardo Becchetti & Stefano Castriota & Pierluigi Conzo, 2012. "Bank strategies in catastrophe settings: empirical evidence and policy suggestions," Econometica Working Papers wp43, Econometica.
    3. Selay Sahan & Euan Phimister, 2023. "Repayment performance of joint‐liability microcredits: Metropolitan evidence on social capital and group names," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 287-311, April.
    4. Yves Jégourel, 2008. "Les fonds d’investissement en microfinance : nouvelle niche de la finance éthique ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 93(3), pages 89-102.
    5. Sunil Puliyakot, 2020. "Determinants of overindebtedness among microfinance borrowers: a poverty line-based approach," Asia-Pacific Sustainable Development Journal, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), vol. 27(1), pages 20-41, June.
    6. El-Komi, Mohamed & Croson, Rachel, 2013. "Experiments in Islamic microfinance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 252-269.

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