Access to Finance and Investment: Does Profit Sharing Dominate Debt?
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- ZOUARI, Zeineb & NABI, Mahmoud Sami, 2013.
"Enhancing the Enforceability of Islamic Microfinance Contracts in OIC countries,"
49816, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- ZOUARI, Zeineb & NABI, Mahmoud Sami, 2015. "Enhancing The Enforceability Of Islamic Microfinance Contracts In Oic Countries," Policy Papers 1435-2, The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute (IRTI).
- Hasan, Zubair, 2016. "Risk-sharing the sole basis of Islamic finance? time for a serious rethink," MPRA Paper 72252, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Apr 2018.
- Hasan, Zubair, 2015. "Risk-sharing: the sole basis of Islamic finance? It is time for a serious rethink," MPRA Paper 66895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hasan, Zubair, 2015. "Risk sharing versus risk transfer in Islamic Finance: A critical appraisal," MPRA Paper 65028, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2015.
- Saeed Al-Muharrami & Daniel C Hardy, 2013. "Cooperative and Islamic Banks; What can they Learn from Each Other?," IMF Working Papers 13/184, International Monetary Fund.
More about this item
KeywordsProfit sharing; debt contract; moral hazard.;
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