IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/irtiwp/0000_000.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Access to Finance and Investment: Does Profit Sharing Dominate Debt?

Author

Listed:
  • Nabi, Mahmoud Sami

    (The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute (IRTI))

Abstract

This paper compares sharing (equity) and debt contracts in presence of moral hazard which manifests as the hidden effort undertaken by the entrepreneur. The originality of this paper relatively to the existing studies consists in performing the comparison between the two types of contracts while considering a more general context along two dimensions. The first dimension is enabling the internal funds of the entrepreneur to vary between 0% and a level just inferior to 100%. The second dimension is the incorporation of an incentive mechanism to the sharing contract in the context of a two‐period relationship. I showed that the sharing and debt contracts are feasible when the internal funds of the entrepreneur are superior to determined thresholds. These thresholds depend on the characteristics of the project (size, payoffs, and probability of success/failure) and the opportunity cost of the financier. The debt contract is shown to be characterized by larger financial access than the sharing contract. I have also shown that the enlargement of the financial‐relationship to two periods has an incentivizing effect on the entrepreneur and enlarges the region of financial access for the two types of contracts, if a common condition of sufficiently foresighted entrepreneur is satisfied. However, two distinct conditions are also necessary for the enlargement of the financial access to occur. For the sharing contract, the second condition is related to the size of the project which should be inferior to a determined threshold. For the debt contract, the second condition is related to the threat of non‐renewal of the financing in case of first‐period failure, which should be sufficiently stringent. In addition, it has been shown that the more restrictive the threat of non‐renewal the larger the region of financial access. However, this is realized at the expense of the second period investment which decreases, and represents the economic efficiency’ effect of the debt contract. Finally, I discussed the effect on the financial access of taxing the “risk‐free” financial operation and subsidizing the “higher effort” of the insufficiently‐capitalized entrepreneurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Nabi, Mahmoud Sami, 1437. "Access to Finance and Investment: Does Profit Sharing Dominate Debt?," Working Papers 0000-0, The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute (IRTI).
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:irtiwp:0000_000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.irti.org/English/Research/Documents/331.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    2. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1994. " Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 371-402, June.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
    5. Trester, Jeffrey J., 1998. "Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 675-699, August.
    6. Siddiqi, Mohammad Nejatullah, 2006. "Islamic Banking And Finance In Theory And Practice: A Survey Of State Of The Art," Islamic Economic Studies, The Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), vol. 13, pages 2-48.
    7. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
    8. Dang, Viet Anh, 2010. "Optimal financial contracts with hidden effort, unobservable profits and endogenous costs of effort," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 75-89, February.
    9. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    10. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. ZOUARI, Zeineb & NABI, Mahmoud Sami, 2013. "Enhancing the Enforceability of Islamic Microfinance Contracts in OIC countries," MPRA Paper 49816, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Hasan, Zubair, 2016. "Risk-sharing the sole basis of Islamic finance? time for a serious rethink," MPRA Paper 72252, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Apr 2018.
    3. Hasan, Zubair, 2015. "Risk-sharing: the sole basis of Islamic finance? It is time for a serious rethink," MPRA Paper 66895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Hasan, Zubair, 2015. "Risk sharing versus risk transfer in Islamic Finance: A critical appraisal," MPRA Paper 65028, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2015.
    5. Saeed Al-Muharrami & Daniel C Hardy, 2013. "Cooperative and Islamic Banks; What can they Learn from Each Other?," IMF Working Papers 13/184, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Profit sharing; debt contract; moral hazard.;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:irtiwp:0000_000. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Research Division). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/irisbsa.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.